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The purpose of this study was to determine an appro-
priate strategy for the defense of NATO's Northern Flank.
If NATO fails to successfully defend this Flank, its vital
North Atlantic SLOCs will be severely threatened and the
rear of the Central Front will be exposed to attack from the
sea. Norway's strategic location makes it the key to the
defense of the region. Deterrence, the defense of Norway,
and the protection of the Atlantic SLOCs are the fundamental
goals of NATO in the region. Under current conditions NATO
must meet two basic objectives to achieve these goals--the
Alliance must provide reinforcements to Norway very early in
a crisis and it must control the Norwegian Sea to maintain
the war effort after the outbreak of hostilities. Four
strategic options were considered in this analysis: expan-
sion of deterrence, increased prepositioning, a defensive
barrier, and forward defense. Of the four strategies,
forward defense is recommended because it is the only
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I. INTRODUCTION
NATO's Northern Flank is a maritime flank that extends
from the Elbe-Trave Canal in northern West Germany to the
North Cape of Norway. It has recently received considerable
attention in the U.S. Congress and the Western press because
of the important role that it plays in the U.S. Navy's
Maritime Strategy. Although its importance is clearly
secondary to the Alliance's Central Front, there seems to be
a consensus among strategic analysts that World War III may
not be won on the Northern Flank, but it could very well be
lost there. 1 This conclusion is based on the relatively free
access to the North Atlantic and the rear of the Central
Front that the Soviets would gain if they are able to
successfully turn the Northern Flank. The relationship
between the defense of the Northern Flank and the security
of Western Europe was summed up quite succinctly by General
Sir Walter Walker, former Commander-in-Chief of Allied
Forces, Northern Europe, in 1971:
If our northern flank should be turned, America s access
to Europe would be exposed and thus her ability to aid
us would be curtailed. NATO's northern flank is an area
whose importance is growing .... Its defense is vital
to the very survival of the West as a whole. 2
The Northern Flank can be divided into two distinct
geographic areas, each with its own unique defense
x This conclusion is attributed to Robert C. Weinland in
War and Peace in the North: Some Political Implications of
he Changing Military Situation in Northern Europe," paper
resented to the "Conference on the Nordic Balance in
Perspective: The Changing Military and Political Situation,
"University, Washington, D.C., 15-16 June 1978. It is




Agenda Paper no. 10 (New York: ""National
Strategy Information Center, 1979), p. 95.
2Leighton, p. 7.
considerations. For the purpose of this study, these two
areas will be referred to as the southern and northern
regions of the Northern Flank. Northern West Germany,
Denmark, and southern Norway make up the southern region.
The principal defense concerns in this region are preventing
the Soviet capture of the Danish Straits and protecting the
Central Front's Baltic Sea flank. The northern region
includes central and northern Norway as well as the
Norwegian controlled Svalbard Archipelago. In the northern
region, NATO is particularly concerned with defending
northern Norway and maintaining control of the Norwegian
Sea.
Because of its central location between the two regions,
the successful defense of Norway is considered the key to
preventing a major setback or possibly even a catastrophe on
the Northern Flank. At the outbreak of a major East-West
war in Europe, the Soviets will undoubtedly invade northern
Norway. Their purpose will be to capture Norwegian military
facilities which will enable them to move the bases for
their ships, submarines, and aircraft over 1,000 miles
closer to NATO's Atlantic sea lines of communication
(SLOCs). Additionally, from these bases in northern Norway
the Soviets will be able to launch attacks to the south to
capture the rest of Norway. Soviet control over southern
Norway would greatly increase > the likelihood of their
capture of the Danish Straits which would severely threaten
the seaward flank of NATO's Central Front. Within the
context of these threats, geo-strategic , historical, and
political reasons dictate that the NATO Alliance must
prevent the Soviet capture of northern Norway.
In a 1983 Proceedings article, U.S. Navy Secretary John
F« Lehman asserted that geography was the most dominant
principle of maritime power and that at present ". .
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geography overwhelmingly favors the Free World alliance." 3
On the Northern Flank geography is indeed a NATO advantage,
but it is an advantage that must be defended. Norway occu-
pies a commanding position in the northern region. Its
location allows NATO to maintain close surveillance of
Soviet military activities during peacetime and it also
provides the Alliance with an opportunity to achieve
defense-in-depth of the Flank during war. As a result of
these factors,
NATO commanders in Europe have long believed that from
the standpoint of Soviet strategy, Norway, on the alli-
ances ' s extreme northern flank, is vital to success at
sea. Some expect that the Soviet Union might move into
the area before fighting began in Central Europe.
Norway has sovereignty over the Svalbard Archipelago
which is located in the middle of a maritime gap that
stretches from the northeast corner of Greenland to the
North Cape of Norway. 5 The Greenland- Svalbard-North Cape gap
controls the access from the Barents Sea and Arctic Ocean to
the Norwegian Sea (see Figure 1.1). This gap together with
the Greenland- Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap gives NATO
".
. . considerable control over the exits from the northern
Soviet ports." 6 Free movement through both of these gaps is
considered absolutely essential for the Soviet Union's stra-
tegic and economic interests in the region.
3 John F. Lehman, "Nine Principles for the Future of
American Maritime Power, "Proceedings 110 (February 1984):
48. B~
'Drew Middleton, "Navy Sees Limit on Ability in Atlantic
War," New York Times
,
20 February 1980, p. A6
.
5 Svalbard is an Arctic archipelago that includes the
Spitzbergen group of islands, Bear Island, and Hopen Island.
It has been under Norwegian control since 1925. See Kirsten
Amundsen, Norway , NATO and the Forgotten Soviet Challenge
,
Policy Papers in International Affairs , nol 1% (Berkeley
:
University of California, 1981), pp. 16-17.
s Christian Eliot, "Autumn Forge Exercise Ocean Safari



































'— f NC.L AND
U. S. S. R.
(Source: Leighton, p. xi.)
Figure 1.1 The Northern Flank.
As students of military history, especially World War
II, the Soviets must recognize the value of Norway in any
battle for the Atlantic. "Experience during World War II
showed conclusively that the German forces occupying the
long Norwegian coastline posed a constant threat to Allied
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shipping operations in the Atlantic." 7 The airfields and
deep fjords of northern Norway are excellent bases for
ships, submarines, and aircraft conducting strikes against
enemy naval forces in the Norwegian Sea and North Atlantic.
Capture of Norway was a vital prerequisite to Germany's
invasion of Russia and ". . . control of Norway by the
Kremlin would be a prelude to applying decisive pressure on
Germany, NATO's heartland." 8
At the present time Norway's air and naval bases are a
major NATO advantage. They pose a significant threat to the
Soviet forces operating in the area, but they are also very
vulnerable to capture by the Soviets. Based on the histor-
ical experience, the Soviets will surely attempt to capture
northern Norway and its bases very early in a conflict with
the West. If the Soviets are successful, these same bases
will certainly be used against NATO in subsequent operations
and their loss could very well insure Soviet success on the
Northern Flank.
Beyond the geo-strategic and historical reasons for
pursuing a strategy that provides for a credible defense of
Norway, there is the basic commitment of the NATO Alliance
to provide for the common defense. If NATO concedes the
Norwegian Sea to the Soviets by establishing a maritime
defensive barrier across the GIUK gap, this commitment will
not be met by the Alliance because Norway will fall behind
Soviet lines. Although some would argue that this is NATO's
only alternative because of the balance of naval forces in
the region, it is not a strategy that NATO can politically
afford to pursue. With the Norwegian Sea under Soviet domi-
nation, NATO cannot resupply and reinforce Norway to the
degree necessary to insure its defense. The Norwegians know
this and so do the Soviets. What must be understood is that
7 Amundsen, p. 4.
8 Leighton, p . 3
.
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Alliance cohesion is required both for going into war
and for sustaining containment after war termination.
If we forfeit the defense of any NATO ally, we give the
Soviets a leverage point to start destroying the
Alliance in detail. 9
Under current conditions control of the Norwegian Sea is
necessary to insure the successful defense of Norway and
more importantly, to protect NATO's North Atlantic SLOCs
.
If NATO is unable to protect its Atlantic lifelines because
it cannot establish control of the Norwegian Sea, the
Alliance's strategy for the defense of Western Europe loses
its credibility and the situation on the Central Front
becomes untenable. By maintaining a viable strategy and a
credible capability to defend Norway the Alliance should be
able to deter Soviet aggression on the Northern Flank. If
deterrence fails somewhere else in the world and a major
East-West war erupts, a strong defense posture in the
northern region will permit the defense-in-depth of the
Atlantic SLOCs.
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the stra-
tegic situation on the Northern Flank with specific emphasis
on the northern region. From this investigation, a set of
goals and objectives will be determined to provide a basis
of analysis for NATO's strategic options in the region.
Several strategies will be analyzed with the intention of
determining their applicability to the stated goals and
objectives. In the end this process will lead to the formu-
lation of a strategy that meets the objectives and achieves
the goals.
9 Robert S. Wood and John T. Hanley, "The Maritime Role
in the North Atlantic," to be published in The U.S. Navy:
View From the 1980' s, ed. James George (Boulder, Co.:
Westview Press, forthcoming, 1985) p. 8.
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II. SCENARIO
In the spring of 1988, the Soviet leadership determined
that a significant shift in the 'correlation of forces' had
taken place. Throughout the world the forces of socialism
were slowly gaining an advantage over the West and the
Soviet leaders believed that an opportunity existed for the
Soviet Union to assert its power and achieve a major stra-
tegic breakthrough.
With Nicaragua firmly in the Soviet camp, its Marxist
regime was free to export its revolution throughout Latin
America and the U.S. was clearly on the defensive. American
public opinion against any action in Central America that
could possibly lead to military involvement eliminated the
threat of U.S. intervention. The Soviet Union through Cuba
had kept the Sandinistas in power during the mid- 1980 's and
now the Sandinistas were paying their debt to their masters
in Moscow.
Racial unrest in South Africa had blossomed into full-
scale civil war with a Marxist faction in the vanguard of
the ant i- government movement. Realizing that the fall of
the Pretoria government would jeopardize Western access to
several strategic minerals, the Soviets through their Cuban
proxies in Angola were openly extending their 'fraternal
assistance' to the revolutionaries. Because of the racial
nature of the civil war and the Reagan Administration's
strong opposition to a violent overthrow of white rule, the
U.S. could not intervene to support the Government nor could
it back any of the revolutionaries. The U.S. was essen-
tially powerless and the Soviets were taking advantage of
American weakness in this very critical region.
Without much opposition from the West, the Soviet geno-
cide campaign against the Afghan rebels was rapidly
approaching its successful conclusion. The Soviet forces
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in Afghanistan were in complete control of the cities and
almost all of the countryside. Their 'fraternal assistance'
was reduced to 50,000 troops (two motorized rifle divisions
and several supporting units) which were deployed along the
Pakistani border. The 'puppet' government in Kabul was
leading the country toward socialism in accordance with the
Soviet model and there was serious concern in Pakistan about
the next Soviet move.
Despite these significant Soviet advances, the West was
too preoccupied with domestic issues to "recognize the
growing seeds of confrontation. This preoccupation was at
its peak in the United States where a liberal upsurge was
gaining momentum and rapidly replacing the conservative
consensus of the early 1980' s. Continued unfavorable
balance of trade deficits had forced the United States to
take actions that caused friction with its trading partners
and seriously strained its alliances. Efforts to eliminate
Federal budget deficits and reduce the national debt finally
forced domestic spending cuts and increased taxes. These
actions sharply polarized the American electorate. The
results of this polarization were obvious during the 1986
congressional elections when the Democrats regained control
of the Senate and expanded their lead in the House.
As a result of the cuts in domestic spending, continua-
tion of the Reagan Administration's defense build-up became
politically impossible to support in Congress. By 1986 real
growth in the defense budget had ceased and this trend
continued until 1988. Because of this freeze in defense
spending the modernization of the U.S. strategic nuclear
deterrent force could not keep pace with the relentless
Soviet building program. Conventional force improvements
had to be substantially cut or extended well into the 1990 's
while the '600- Ship Navy' was complete, but critically short
of manpower.
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The stagnation of the defense budget in the United
States made it extremely difficult for the U.S. to assume
its leadership role in NATO and put pressure on its allies
to continue meeting the Alliance goal of three percent real
growth. NATO was slipping further behind the Warsaw Pact
and with the existing economic conditions there was not much
that could be done. The balance of military power, one of
the most critical factors in the computation of the 'corre-
lation of forces,' was overwhelmingly in favor of the Warsaw
Pact.
As a result of NATO's conventional military weakness and
Soviet strategic nuclear superiority, the world had been
made safe for increased Soviet adventurism even at the risk
of conventional war between the superpowers. The Soviets
now turned their attention to what the British press once
called "the Achilles Heel of NATO." 10
In early June 1988, the Soviets made it clear to the
Norwegian Government that they sought a permanent solution
to the 'Grey Zone' dispute, revocation of the Svalbard
Treaty, a Soviet-Norwegian condominium to rule Svalbard, and
sovereignty over Bear Island. 11 The Norwegians put these
issues before the World Court because it was apparent to
them that any agreement reached in bilateral negotiations
with the Soviet Union would be unfavorable to Norway and
would require substantial concessions on their part. The
Soviets responded with a refusal to abide by the ruling of
the Court and announced extensive plans for resource explo-
ration in the 'Grey Zone' and on Svalbard.
With tension in the region mounting, the Soviets began
their annual naval exercise in the Norwegian, Barents, and
North seas with units from the Northern and Baltic 'Red
l a The Sunday Times (London), 15 October 1978, p. 8.
xl For detailed discussion of these issues see pp. 48-55
below.
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Banner' Fleets. In addition to these fleets, the Soviets
also exercised the ground and air forces of the Leningrad
Military District in an obvious attempt to pressure the
Norwegians. After two weeks of intensive operations at the
end of July which included an amphibious assault against the
Kola Peninsula coast, the Soviet ships returned to port for
a brief period of reorganization and repair. On 3 August,
they put to sea again for what appeared to be a second round
of operations, but their true intentions became all too
apparent during the early hours of 5 August.
At dawn on 5 August 1988, a regiment of the Soviet 63rd
'Kirkenes' Naval Infantry Brigade with the support of an air
assault battalion captured the entire Svalbard Archipelago.
Using the naval exercise as a cover for the invasion and
Spetsnaz troops that were already on the main island of
Spitzbergen, the Soviets were able to achieve complete
surprise. Norway and NATO were presented with a most
unpleasant fait accompli .
Immediately after the invasion, two Norwegian submarines
that were on patrol in the Norwegian Sea penetrated the ASW
(anti-submarine warfare) screen around the Soviet amphibious
group. They sank two Soviet transports and a guided-missile
destroyer (DDG). Unfortunately, only one of the submarines
survived the Soviet counterattack. Norwegian F-16s and
guided-missile patrol boats also struck Soviet warships that
were supporting the invasion. Their attacks were devas-
tating, but costly, with another Soviet DDG and three
frigates (FF's) going to the bottom in exchange for two
F-16s and two patrol boats. The Soviets were obviously
surprised by the ferocity of the Norwegian attacks, but the
sheer weight of their numbers eventually began to show.
Masses of Soviet fighter and ground attack aircraft were
slowly winning control of the skies above Svalbard, the
Barents, and most of northern Norway.
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By mid- afternoon on the 5th, the military forces of NATO
had been placed on alert and the Norwegians began mobilizing
their reserves. The Soviet response to this move again
caught NATO and Norway by surprise. An hour after Norway
started its mobilization, the Soviet 76th Airborne Division
supported by two air assault regiments and Spetsnaz troops
captured the northern Norwegian airfields at Banak, Andoya,
and Bardufoss. While this was happening, two armored spear-
heads were driving toward the main Norwegian defense line in
the Province of Troms . One formation, led by the 45th Motor
Rifle Division, crossed the Norwegian border into Finmark.
This force easily defeated the Norwegian defenders along the
border and it continued down the only major road in the
Province to join up with the airborne forces at Banak for
the move further south. The other Soviet invasion force was
led by the 54th Motor Rifle Division and it attacked through
the 'Finnish wedge' to outflank the main Norwegian defenses
along the Lyngen Fjord. 12 To make matters worse, the Soviets
landed a large amphibious force composed of naval infantry
brigades from the Northern and Baltic Fleets south of Troms,
to surround the Norwegians
.
As NATO leaders debated the appropriate response to the
Soviet aggression, it became apparent that NATO lacked the
conventional military capability to project its power into
the region and forcibly remove the Soviets from northern
Norway and Svalbard without risking escalation. Insuring
the success of such an operation required forces that would
threaten the Soviet homeland and these forces would surely
prompt a decisive Soviet response. It was feared that the
conflict would then spread to the Central Front and ulti-
mately lead to World War III.
1 2 The Finnish wedge is the northwest corner of Finland
which is sandwiched between Norway and Sweden.
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Because of these considerations, NATO was faced with. two
basic alternatives: (1) military action--which could lead
to World War III and the possible destruction of the civi-
lized world as we know it; or (2) no military action- -which
could lead to further Soviet aggression, the disintegration
of NATO, and the fall of Western Europe. The Soviets had
decisively seized the initiative and NATO was fumbling for
an appropriate response.
There are three key points that should be taken from
this scenario. First and most important is the fact that
World War III could very well start on the Northern Flank.
It is a critical region for both sides and if presented with
an opportunity the Soviets could conceivably use military
force to gain a decisive advantage. The second point has to
do with the correlation of forces. Without an obvious shift
in correlation of forces away from the West, the Soviets
will not risk war with NATO. If a shift does occur and the
West appears weak enough, the Soviets may attempt to gain a
strategic advantage in the region, even at the risk of war.
The final point is that the Soviets have the standing
forces, operational flexibility, and strategic access that
they need to carry out a successful surprise attack against
northern Norway.
A scenario like the one outlined above can be avoided if
NATO maintains a credible deterrent on the Northern Flank.
To make that deterrent credible, NATO must possess the capa-
bility to carry out a strategy that achieves the Alliance's
most basic goals in the region- -the defense of Norway and
the protection of the North Atlantic SLOCs
.
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III. NORWAY AND NATO VERSUS THE USSR
The Soviet military threat to Norway and the Northern
Flank is composed of two distinct theaters of military oper-
ations (TVDs)--the Arctic TVD and the Northwestern TVD. It
is expected that each of these TVDs will be activated during
wartime. The Arctic TVD has a maritime orientation and its
forces will come mainly from the Soviet Northern Fleet while
the Northwestern TVD is land oriented and it will draw its
forces from the Leningrad Military District.
A. THE NORWEGIAN DEFENSE POSTURE
The foundation on which Norwegian defense policy is
built is membership in NATO. In the context of Norway's
extremely small population, its exposed strategic location,
and the overwhelming threat posed by the Soviet Union on its
northeastern border, this reliance on NATO is easily under-
stood. Over the years the Norwegians have also placed
several restrictions on their participation in the Alliance.
These restrictions were intended to reduce tension in the
region, but they have also severely limited NATO's deterrent
options on the Northern Flank. Because of these restric-
tions deterrence and the successful defense of Norway are
contingent upon the Alliance's ability to deliver reinforce-
ments during a conflict. Additionally, the Norwegians are
only able to maintain small standing forces that are
designed merely to buy time during an invasion. What
results from this set of circumstances is a Norwegian
defense system that is critically dependent on the rapid
mobilization of its own reserves and the timely arrival of
reinforcements from the rest of NATO.
21
1. Dependence on NATO
The Norwegians have long felt that membership in
NATO and the defense guarantee from the United States that
goes along with that membership are essential to their
national security. Besides deterring a Soviet attack,
"linkage to the security structure in Europe at large is a
means to preserve a low military posture in Northern
Europe." 13 This low military posture in Norway results in a
situation where NATO reinforcements are necessary for a
credible deterrent and defense.
Norway's dependence on NATO for reinforcement and
resupply is best understood by looking at the numbers
involved in this effort. During the initial stages of a war
with the Soviet Union, NATO will provide over 30,000 men,
6,000 vehicles, nearly 200 aircraft, and over 20,000 tons of
supplies. These figures are impressive, but what is even
more important is that beyond these initial reinforcement
requirements Norway will be extremely dependent on NATO for
supplies. The civilian demand for supplies will exceed
2,000 tons per day which is in addition to an estimated
3,000 tons daily to maintain the war effort. 14 Most of these
supplies will have to come by sea and Norway is almost
totally dependent on other NATO navies (most notably the
U.S. and British) to keep open its SLOCs
.
Norwegian support for NATO membership cuts across
political lines. Both the Labor and Conservative Parties
have consistently demonstrated strong support for NATO
membership, regardless of which party is in power. With the
current government controlled by the Conservatives, this
fact was made very clear during recent foreign policy
1
3




Fall 1981, p. 72.
1
"Roy Breivik, Assuring the Security of Reinforcements
to Norway," NATO s Fifteen Nations, special issue no. 2
(1982), pp. 6 6-6 7 .
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debates in the Norwegian Parliament ( Storting ) when the
Labor Party spokesman ". . . stressed that the two pillars
of Norway's defence and security policy are membership in
NATO and the defence guarantee from the USA." 15
Despite this bi-partisan support for NATO member-
ship, there is a strong Norway- out -of -NATO movement that has
gained considerable momentum in recent years. Issues like
the neutron bomb, the dual- track (Pershing II an GLCM)
deployment decision, prepositioning of the equipment for
NATO reinforcements, and the nuclear freeze movement have
caused considerable debate that has sharply polarized
Norwegian public opinion over NATO membership. Regardless
of the Alliance's decisions on these issues, Norway's
vulnerability keeps support for NATO strong regardless of
its policies and recent ". . polls show that some 80
percent of the public continues to consider NATO membership
essential for security." 16
2. Restrictions on Norway ' s Participation in NATO
At the same time that Norway has fostered such
strong ties to NATO, it has been forced to balance its
actions against the defense concerns of its superpower
neighbor. This process is referred to as 'Nordpolitik' and
it is described by Johan J. Hoist, State Secretary for the
Royal Norwegain Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as follows:
The overall objective of Norwegian foreign policy at
present is to develop a framework for a stable order in
the high North based on a balance of pjwer maintained at
the lowest possible level of military activity, and a
pattern of cooperation which cuts across and reduces the
saliency of the military competition. 17
1
5
This statement was made despite Labor's outspoken
opposition to NATO's decision to deploy the Pershing II and
GLCM. John Berg, "The Army Hardest Hit in Norwegian Budget
Plans," Jane ' s Defence Weekly
,
16 June 1984, p. 984.





To make it clear to the Soviets that Norway's
membership in NATO is in no way provocative, the Norwegians
have placed several restrictions on their participation in
the Alliance. These restrictions prohibit the basing of
foreign troops in Norway; ban the deployment of nuclear
weapons to Norway during peacetime; deny allied use of
Norwegian airspace and territorial waters east of the 24th
meridian; and prohibit NATO exercises in the Norwegian prov-
ince of Finmark. 1 8 The cumulative effect of these restric-
tions has been to weaken NATO's deterrent capability on the
Northern Flank and to make Norway's defense extremely depen-
dent on reinforcements from the rest of NATO. Despite these
restrictions ". . . the Soviets give the Norwegians no
credit for their self-imposed restraint and seem not to
believe that Norway is entitled to make defensive prepara-
tions of its own." 19
At the beginning of 1951, Norwegian Minister of
Defense, Jens Christian Hauge
,
precisely defined Norwegian
policy concerning the basing of foreign troops in a speech
to the Storting . What he made extremely clear was that the
policy did not prevent Norway from making preparations for
the arrival of NATO reinforcements, requesting those rein-
forcements in a crisis situation, allowing joint exercises
in Norwegian territory, and allowing brief visits by NATO
air and naval forces. 20 These guidelines have provided a
framework for Norwegian defense planning up to the present.
The decision not to bas^s foreign troops in Norway
was made when NATO had unchallenged world-wide command of
the seas. Control of the Norwegian Sea and the protection
of NATO's Atlantic SLOCs are necessary for the adequate
1 8 Leighton, p. 5
1
9
Robert K. German, "Norway and the Bear: Soviet
Coercive Diplomacy and Norwegian Security Policy,"





reinforcement of Norway. Recognizing their dependence on
NATO reinforcements, Norwegian leaders are quick to point
out that
Counting on Allied reinforcements in a crisis situation
is an essential element of Norwegian policy; Norwegian
officials have also pointed out that it is a precondi-
tion for maintaining the base policy. l
When doubt was raised in the late 1970 's whether the
U.S. Navy could perform both the sea control and SLOC
protection missions simultaneously, a reassessment of the
situation became necessary. 22 As a result of Norwegian
concern over the U.S. Navy's apparent limitations, an agree-
ment was reached with the United States in 1981, to prestock
the heavy equipment for a U.S. Marine Amphibious Brigade
(MAB) in central Norway. This prestocking would allow the
men of the brigade to be airlifted to Norway during a crisis
situation which would greatly reduce the MAB ' s deployment
time. The decision to place the brigade's equipment in
central Norway instead of northern Norway, where the brigade
would ultimately have to fight, was made to keep tension
with the Soviet Union over the issue to a minimum. With the
MAB ' s equipment in central Norway, the Norwegians were able
to preposition the equipment for one of their brigades in
the north. In the long run this decision should prove to
significantly strengthen deterrence because
Moving U.S. Marines into Central Norway constitutes a
more credible means of demonstrating resolve with the
aim of deterring attack, and involves a smaller escala-
tion potential than a direct move into North Norway. It





23 Holst, p. 72.
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3 . Norwegian Military Forces
With a population of only four million people,
Norway's military forces are correspondingly small, but
extremely professional and well organized. Despite the
relatively small size of their military forces, the
Norwegians appear to be confident in their defenses. Much
of this confidence results from their 'total defense
concept' which attempts to maximize the potential of their
limited numbers by relying heavily on the mobilization of
reserves. Major General Olav Breidlid, Inspector General of
the Army, describes the concept as follows:
The defence of the country is the responsibility of
every Norwegian. The total defence concept aims, in time
of war, to achieve the largest possible military forces
with the highest possible quality and, simultaneously,
to obtain maximum support from the civilian infrastruc-
ture and resources in all fields. 2 ''
The total defense concept involves the standing
forces (Army, Navy, and Air Force) which are made up mostly
of conscripts, the Reserves, and the Home Guard as well as
the civilian infrastructure that supports the military
forces. What this system creates is a situation where "in
proportion to population Norway has over four times as many
men in active and reserve forces combined as the United
States." 25 Table I provides a breakdown of the Norwegian




''Under this system every medically qualified male from
the age of 19 to 45 must serve in the armed forces.
Initially this service is with the standing forces as a
conscript (twelve months in the army or fifteen months in
the navy and air force)
reserves. 0. Breidlid,
NATO's Fifteen Nations, special issue no. 1 (1985"), pp
7 0- 7 3.
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id which is followed by service in the
"The Norwegian Mobilisation System,"
25 Richard C. Bowman, "Soviet Options on NATO's Northern















TOTALS: 37,000 201,000** 80,000
* Includes 1,000 personne
** This total includes 10,
1 in the Coastal Artillery.
000 Home Guard reserves.
The ground forces of Norway include a standing army
with 20,000 troops on active duty and 138,000 personnel in
reserve. 26 These forces are spread throughout the country to
protect its most vital areas. Shortly after a mobilization
order is issued, the Reserves will move to these areas by
land, sea, and air. 27 During peacetime the Norwegians main-
tain one all-arms group in southern Norway which is composed
of an infantry battalion, one tank company, field artillery,
and anti-aircraft batteries. In addition to this group,
there is also the 'Royal Guard' infantry battalion and




Because of the Soviet threat to Norway, it is not
surprising to find that most of the combat strength of the
Army is assigned to the defense of northern Norway. The
primary purpose of the standing forces in the north is to
2 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The
Ltary Balance 1985-1986
for Strategic Studies, T9~85




2 There is only one north-south highway that goes all
the way to the Soviet border while the only north- south
railroad ends at Troms . This limited land transportation
network puts a premium on reinforcement by air and sea.
28 Ibid.
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buy time for the mobilization of reserves which are
necessary to stop a major Soviet invasion. Northern
Norway's defenses begin in the province of Finmark which is
on the border with the Soviet Union. As a result of this
province's harsh climate, sparse population, and close prox-
imity to the Soviet Union, its defenses are not very exten-
sive. The forces assigned to defend the entire province
include a reduced infantry battalion (500 men) at South
Varanger garrison which is located outside the city of
Kirkennes 29 and a reinforced battalion group (1,000 men) in
Porsanger which is about 120-miles west of the border. 30
During wartime the Norwegians will mobilize a local brigade
to hold the province's only military airfield at Banak as
long as possible. 31 Based on these meager forces it appears
that the Norwegians consider Finmark to be indefensible and
that they expect to lose it very early in any conflict with
the Soviets, but senior Norwegian military leaders insist ".
. . that every inch of territory will be defended in time of
war." 32
The main Norwegian defense line is about 300-miles





The entire area is considered a natural
fortress with steep mountains and deep fjords that greatly
enhance the Norwegian defenses. Brigade North, a reinforced
light infantry brigade from the standing army, 'is deployed
29 0ne company (150 men) from this battalion guards the
border which has seven border stations and eight discrete
observation posts. The heaviest weapons available to the
battalion are TOW and Carl Gustav anti-tank weapons. Mark
Daly, "Europe's Forgotten Frontier," Jane's Defence Weekly,
20 October 1984, p. 585. ^
3
"Amundsen, p . 6
.
31 Tomas Ries, "Defending the Far North," International
Defense Review
,
no. 7 (1984), p. 879.
32 Daly, p. 685.
33 Erling Bjol, Nordic Security , Adelphi Papers, no. 181
(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies,
1983), p. 24.
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to defend this line. With 5,000 men assigned the Brigade
has three infantry battalions, one tank company, one
artillery battalion, and one anti-aircraft battery. 3 " Table
II summarizes the Norwegain ground forces assigned to the
defense of northern Norway.
TABLE II
NORWEGIAN GROUND FORCES ASSIGNED TO NORTHERN NORWAY
TROOPS LOCATION RESERVES
BRIGADE NORTH: 5,000 TROMS 4 Brigades
1 BATTALION: 500 Varanger None
1 BATTALION:
(reinforced)




Besides the defensive positions that are manned by
Brigade North along the Lyngen Fjord, there are also fifteen
heavily defended coastal artillery fortresses that guard
against attack from the sea. These fortresses are manned by
the Navy and they protect the entrances to the Lyngen and
Ofot fjords which provide access to Tromso and the main
naval base in northern Norway at Olavsern. This area is so
well defended and so difficult to attack that "the local
naval command is confident that it is virtually unassailable




3 k International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 55
Spetsnaz is an acronym for Soviet special operations
troops. Their missions include covert operations behind
enemy lines, both before and after the outbreak of hostili-




During a war Brigade North will be reinforced by two
brigades that are mobilized locally and two brigades that
are to be flown in from the south. 36 These brigades should
be in place within two or three days after the start of
mobilization. In addition to these four brigades and the
brigade mobilized in Finmark, the Norwegians can mobilize at
least seven more brigades and several independent infantry,
cavalry, artillery, and special purpose units. Together all
of these units give the Norwegian Army a total strength of
at least fifteen brigades or five division equivalents
(based on a standard division with three brigades). 37
With emphasis on small vessels that are ideally
suited to an anti-invasion role, the Norwegian Navy is
tasked with defending Norway's long coastline and protecting
its coastal SLOCs . To accomplish these missions the Navy
has 7,600 personnel on active duty and 22,400 reserves. 38
Its main combat force consists of fourteen coastal subma-
rines, 38 guided-missile patrol craft, five small frigates,
and several support craft units. 39 These forces are not
capable of challenging the Soviet Navy for control of the
Norwegian Sea and in fact, they will be hard-pressed to
conduct operations outside of Norwegian territorial waters.
The Norwegian Air Force plays a crucial role in the
defense of Norway and NATO's Northern Flank. With 9,400
active duty personnel, 92 combat aircraft, and 30,000
reserves, * ° the Air Force is tasked with defending the
3 The equipment for one of these brigades has already
been prepositioned in the area while the other brigade is in
the process of prestocking its equipment. Ries
,
p. 879.
37 A Norwegian brigade has about 5,000 troops and is
normally employed as an independent unit. International
Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 55.
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airspace above Norway and protecting its airfields.
Additionally, the Air Force must support the forces fighting
on the ground and at sea. Because of Norway's dependence on
reinforcement by air and sea, the Air Force's success at
performing its missions will largely determine the outcome
of the conflict on the Northern Flank. Norway's recent
acquisition of 69 modern F-16 fighter/ground attack aircraft
has dramatically improved the Air Force's capability to
carry out its missions. 41 These aircraft along with sixteen
less advanced F-5A fighters and seven P-3B maritime patrol
aircraft are the only combat aircraft available to the Air
Force.
In northern Norway the Air Force operates from bases
at Bodo , Bardufoss, Andoya, and the previously mentioned
base at Banak. Two squadrons of F-16s (Squadrons 331 and
334) are stationed at Bodo and they are often dispersed or
deployed to the other bases in the region. There is also a
squadron of P-3Bs stationed at Andoya.'* 2 These forces must
control the airspace over northern Norway and they must
challenge the Soviets over the adjacent seas. Their success
is absolutely critical to the defense of Norway and the
Northern Flank.
The small size of the standing forces makes the
rapid and secure mobilization of the reserves for each
service essential to Norway's defense. Norway is credited
^The increased range capability of the F-16s over the
Norwegian Air Force's old F-104s (an almost 100 percent
increase) has accounted for a substantial rise in the number
of Soviet aircraft that have been successfully intercepted
and inspected near Norwegian territory. Prior to 1984 the
annual average number of intercepts was 150, but in 1984
(the first full year of F-16 operations) the total was 471.
John Berg, "F-16 Increases Norway's Interception Range,"
Jane s Defence Weekly
,
26 January 1985, p. 133.
42 The remaining fighter/ground attack aircraft are
stationed at Rygg Air Force Base in south-eastern Norway and
Oerland Air Force Base in central Norway in accordance with
the following: Squadron 332 (F-16s), Rygg; Squadron 336
(all remaining F-5As), Rygg; and Squadron 338 (currently
flying F-5As, but converting to F-16sJ, Oerland. Ibid.
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with one of the fastest mobilization systems in NATO and the
Home Guard is the internal security force that makes sure
mobilization can take place. 43 With a total of 80,000
personnel, each military service has its own Home Guard
contingent which secures its mobilization depots and key
strategic areas immediately after the mobilization order.'*''
To facilitate this process each member of the Home Guard
keeps his personal weapon, ammunition, and combat equipment
at home rather than at mobilization centers like the reserve
units. There is considerable concern about the use of
Soviet Spetsnaz troops against Norway and the Home Guard is
the country's first line of defense against this threat .
*
5
4. NATO Reinforcements for Norway
"Allied reinforcements rather than forward
stationing constitute the core of deterrence on NATO's
northern flank.'"* 6 There are several NATO units available
for the reinforcement of Norway to support this deterrence
policy, but these forces can only be deployed upon the
request of the Norwegian government. This request can take
place during a crisis or after the outbreak of hostilities,
but the earlier that it occurs the better NATO's chances are
of carrying out its reinforcement plans. It is for this
U3 The elapsed time from the issuing of the mobilization
order until a unit is ready to move to its assembly area is
dependent on the when the order is given (time of day and
season of the year) and the size of the unit. The
approximate times for the various units are: Home Guard,
3-4 hours; a company size unit, 6-12 hours; a battalion size
unit, 12-24 hours; a brigade size unit, 36 hours.- For a
complete description of trie Norwegian mobilization system
see Breidlid, pp. 70-72.
""Of the 80,000 personnel in the Home Guard, 72.100 are
assigned to the Army; 5,400 to the Navy; and 2,500 to the
Air Force. The Home Guard is organized into small sections,
platoons or air defense batteries. International Institute
for Strategic Studies, pp. 45-46.
<* 5 As a result of this concern about Soviet Spetsnaz
troops, it was recently announced that the Norwegian police
forces would receive training to help counter this threat.
"Norwegian Anti-Spetsnaz Role," Jane s Defence Weekly, 2
Novemblr 1985, p. 959. J~
" 6 Holst, p. 72.
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reason that Norway's Minister of Defense, Anders C.
Sjaastad, recently asserted that his country would request
reinforcements early, "... even at the risk of increasing
tension."* 7
The first units to arrive in Norway after the
outbreak of hostilities (or upon the request of the
Government) should be up to eight squadrons (96 aircraft) of
fighter/ground attack aircraft.'* 8 These aircraft squadrons
should be in place within 48 hours and their mission will be
to assist the Norwegian Air Force in defending Norway's
airspace and its major airfields. Because much of Norway's
immediate reinforcement will be by air, these aircraft are
extremely critical to the outcome of the battle.
With its heavy equipment and supplies stockpiled in
central Norway, the U.S. Marine Amphibious Brigade is
expected to be one of the first NATO reinforcement units to
arrive in Norway. Additional reinforcements could possibly
include the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force and the
United Kingdom/Netherlands Amphibious Force. Because of its
mission and its capability to be rapidly deployed, it is
highly probable that the ACE Mobile Force will be the first
non-Norwegian NATO force in Norway. 49 The ACE Mobile Force
is largely a deterrent force which lacks the staying-power
to make a major contribution to the defense of Norway.
Theoretically, it should be deployed to Norway before the
outbreak of hostilities to signal NATO's resolve in the
"•'Mark Daly, "Norway Will React Quickly Promises Defence
Minister," Jane s Defence Weekly
,
13 October 1984, p. 619.
" 8 Ries, p. 880.
"
'Known as SACEUR's 'fire brigade', the Ace Mobile Force
is a multi-national organization which was created to
support NATO's flexible response doctrine. It has land and
air contingents that are drawn from seven NATO nations.
Canada, Britain, the Netherlands and the U.S. concentrate
on the Northern Flank while Belgium, West Germany and Italy
take care of the Southern Flank. See Charles Messenger,
The ACE Mobile Force," Jane's 1983-84 Military Review, ed
.
Ian V. Hogg (London: Jane's Publishing, 1983), pp. 21-31.
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region.
On the other hand, NATO will depend heavily on the
contribution of the UK/Netherlands Amphibious Force.
Although its heavy equipment and war supplies are not prepo-
sitioned in Norway, it can be deployed to Norway during a
crisis situation in a relatively short period of time. This
short deployment time results from the close proximity of
the countries involved and carefully prepared deployment
plans. 50 The Force receives extensive training and it is
fully equipped to fight in the harsh Norwegian environment,
but there is growing concern that Norway will not be able to
count on its services in the future. This concern stems
from the debate in the British government over whether or
not the Royal Navy should replace its current generation of
amphibious assault ships which will be retired during the
1990s. 51 Amphibious assault ships are needed to deliver the
Anglo/Dutch Marines to Norway during wartime and without a
new generation of ships the Royal Navy will lack that
capability.
Each of the above units has other taskings outside
of Norway that might have higher priority and cause them to
be sent elsewhere. The only earmarked ground combat unit is
the Canadian Air-Sea Transportable (CAST) Brigade, but
because its heavy equipment is not stockpiled in Norway the
Brigade could take up to thirty days to arrive by sea. 52
5
° To reduce its deployment time even more, this force
could be placed on ships and stationed off the coast of
Norway ready to be inserted during a crisis situation. J.
D. Ladd, Marines' General Calls for Urgent Ship Study,"
Jane ' s Defence Weekly , 4 February 1984, p. 141.
51 This debate centers around the cost of replacing these
ships and the cost-effectiveness of airborne forces. One
side argues that the cost-effective solution is greater
reliance on airlift and the other side insists that a sea-
based amphibious force ". . . is the Dest kind of fire
extinguisher because of its flexibility, reliability,
logistic simplicity and relative economy." Joseph Porter,
"Will Heseltine Replace UK's Amphibious Fleet?," Jane's
Defence Weekly
,
28 September 1985, pp. 686-689.
52 Ries, p. 879.
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*
This Brigade is also trained and equipped for combat in
Norway and when it finally arrives it will serve as a mecha-
nized reserve force. 53
After NATO's initial reinforcement of Norway (in the
first 48 hours), the Alliance should be able to provide up
to 168 additional aircraft and the balance of its ground
reinforcements during the next one to three weeks. 514 If the
decision is made to send in the additional aircraft
reinforcements, the U.S. Marine Corps and the ACE Mobile
Force (Air) will be providing up to ten squadrons of
aircraft. Table III is a summary of the NATO reinforcements
that are available for Norway.
TABLE III
NATO REINFORCEMENTS FOR NORWAY
AIRCRAFT GROUND FORCES










If the Norwegians are able to mobilize their
reserves and promptly deploy them to northern Norway, NATO
should be able to provide the additional forces that are
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needed to stop the Soviets. Counting Norwegian standing
forces and their reserves as well as all of the available
NATO reinforcements, the forces that could be commited to
the defense of Norway total at least 19 brigades and 356
combat aircraft. General Richard C. Bowman (USAF,
retired), the U.S. chairman of a bilateral U. S . -Norwegian
group that studied the defense requirements of the Northern
Flank, offers the following analysis of the reinforcement
situation in northern Norway:
Ultimately . . . the defense of northern Norway depends
on the rate of reinforcement on both sides. The terrain
advantage lies with the Alliance, and this advantage can
be maintained if NATO is ' successful in
even half the rate achieved by the Soviets
TABLE IV











7 division equ:Lva Lents (3 brigades per
In addition to the forces actually committed in
Norway, NATO has several other assets that could play a
major role in the defense of the Northern Flank. First,
American aircraft carrier battle groups operating in the
Norwegian Sea could provide close air support for the NATO
forces fighting on the ground. U.S. Air Force AWACS and air
55 Bowman, p. 95.
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defense fighters (F-4s and F-15s) flying from Iceland are
other assets that are also available in the region. These
aircraft will be relied upon heavily in the battle for the
control of the airspace above Norway and the Norwegian Sea.
Additionally, land-based maritime patrol aircraft (U.S. Navy
P-3Cs) will also be flying from Iceland and they will make a
major contribution to the ASW campaign in the Norwegian
Sea. 5S Finally, long-range strike aircraft (TORNADOs and
FB-llls) flying from Britain have the capability to conduct
deep strikes against Soviet forces in Norway and on the Kola
Peninsula. If employed against these targets, they could
seriously disrupt the Soviet offensive by destroying
follow-on forces and interdicting lines of communication.
B. THE SOVIET THREAT
There are three inter-related aspects of the Soviet
threat to Norway that have very serious implications for the
NATO Alliance. First and foremost is the overt military
threat posed by the tremendous build-up of Soviet forces on
the Kola Peninsula. With these forces alone the Soviets
could conceivably control the seas down to the GIUK Gap,
capture much of Norway, and severely threaten NATO's North
Atlantic SLOC. This aspect of the threat is the most impor-
tant because it creates the strategic circumstances that
make the other aspects of the threat possible. Second,
there are several areas of confrontation between the
Norwegians and the Soviets that could erupt into a conflict
that would draw NATO and the Warsaw Pact into a major war.
This aspect of the threat obviously has the most serious
implications for NATO. Finally, there is the Soviet effort
to isolate Norway from NATO and the United States. The goal
is to achieve a neutral Norway that is ideally similar to
5S T. Malcolm English, "USAF Iceland-Defending the
Atlantic, Jane's Defence Weekly, 17 August 1985, pp.321-322. JLl B
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Finland. This aspect of the threat becomes credible when
the Norwegians perceive that the NATO Alliance can no longer
guarantee their defense because of the Soviet military capa-
bility in the region.
1. The Military Threat
Analysis of Soviet actions in the Northern Flank
region reveals that the overall Soviet strategy is designed
to neutralize Norway. Ideally, this would be done by
peaceful means, but the Soviets have massed the forces in
the region to accomplish this objective militarily, if it
becomes necessary. It not surprising to find that the armed
forces of the Soviet Union outnumber those forces that are
available to defend Norway, but what is surprising to find
out is that the Soviet forces on the Kola Peninsula and in
the Leningrad Military District alone outnumber their
Norwegian neighbors
.
a. The Arctic TVD
During the 1970' s, the West witnessed, the emer-
gence of the Soviet Union as a true maritime power. While
this was happening the size of the U.S. Navy was signifi-
cantly reduced by the retirement (without replacement) of
World War II vintage ships. Nowhere are the results of this
shift in the naval balance more obvious than on the Northern
Flank of NATO.
The Soviet Northern Fleet, with bases on the
Kola Peninsula, possesses the largest force of submarines in
the world. It will provide the bulk of the forces for the
Arctic TVD during wartime and its 38 ballistic missile
submarines (SSBNs) represent its main striking force. In
addition to the SSBNs, the Fleet has 142 other submarines,
80 major surface combatants, 132 minor combatants (including
several amphibious assault ships), and 200 auxiliaries. 57
57 U.S., Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power
1985. 1985, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
T9Z3), pp. 8-13.
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The missions of the Northern Fleet include: strategic
offensive strike, strategic defense (pro-SSBN and anti-SSBN
operations), support of the Ground Forces, and SLOC
interdiction (anti-SLOC and pro-SLOC). 58 Of the four
missions, SLOC interdiction will probably be a low priority
during the initial stages of a war with the West because of
the importance of the first three missions. SLOC interdic-
tion will take on greater significance if NATO forces on the
Central Front are able to hold the Soviets, causing the war
to drag on for a long period of time.
TABLE V
SOVIET NAVAL FORCES ON THE NORTHERN FLANK
NORTHERN FLEET BALTIC FLEET
SUBMARINES: 180 33
MAJOR COMBATANTS: 80 43
MINOR COMBATANTS: 132 347
AUXILIARIES: 200 170
NAVAL AVIATION: 440 270
NAVAL INFANTRY: 1 Brigade 1 Brigade
In addition to its surface ships and submarines,
the Northern Fleet also has 440 aircraft assigned to its
Naval Aviation contingent. 59 These aircraft support the
Fleet in each of its mission areas. Long-range bombers
armed with cruise missiles, strike support aircraft, and ASW
aircraft are all included in the Fleet's air arm. What is
missing in the Northern Fleet is Backfire bombers- -the most
feared strike aircraft in the Soviet Naval Aviation inven-
tory. About 100 bombers are stationed on the Kola
5
"U.S. Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations, Understanding Soviet Naval Developments
,fifth edition, p. 13
59 Soviet Military Power, p. 13.
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Peninsula, but none of these bombers are Backfires. During
recent naval exercises Backfires from the Baltic Fleet have
routinely deployed to the Kola airfield at Olenegorsk and
these deployments have caused considerable speculation
concerning the wartime use of these aircraft. 60
To conduct amphibious operations in the region,
the Fleet has its own naval infantry brigade (the 63rd
'Kirkenes' Brigade) which is stationed on the Kola Peninsula
at Pechenga. This brigade has received considerable
attention in recent years because of its major quantitative
and qualitative improvements. It has been expanded from a
regiment of 1,800 men to its current strength of about
3,000. Its aging force of 30 tanks has been replaced by 50
modern tanks and 150 armored personnel carriers. The 45th
Motor Rifle Division (which is also stationed near Pechenga)
has been trained to support the Brigade during amphibious
assaults. Additionally, Mi-24 Hind helicopters now provide
fire support for the Brigade during exercises. 61 These
increases in the Brigade's size, equipment, and firepower
have recently been supplemented by six (possibly seven)
Lebed class tank-carrying assault hovercraft which greatly
enhance its mobility. 62 Hovercraft will give the Brigade the
capability to carry out its missions despite the rough
terrain and harsh weather conditions of northern Europe.
6
"There is considerable debate over the wartime role of
these Backfire bombers. Although the aircraft are stationed
near Leningrad, they routinely deploy to the Kola Peninsula
and participate in Northern Fleet exercises. There is
little doubt that the Backfire is more suited to tactical
employment with the Northern Fleet which raises speculation
that these aircraft are based further south to comply with
the spirit of the SALT II agreements. See Hugh Lucas,
"Backfire Takes Part in USSR's Navy Exercise," Jane's
Defence Weekly , 14 April 1984, p. 547, and Tomas Ries-; "A"
New Strategy for the North-East Atlantic," International
Defense Review , no. 12 (1984), pp. 1802-1803.
61 Ries, p. 878.
62 Roy McLeavy, "Soviet Hovercraft Based Near Norwegian
Border," Jane's Defence Weekly , 12 May 1985, p. 719.
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It is believed that this emphasis on the
Brigade's combat capability indicates a Soviet intention to
conduct amphibious operations in the region during wartime.
This intention is reflected in the observations of NATO
officials concerning expected Soviet operations during a
campaign against NATO's Northern Flank. An undisclosed
British Navy source summed up this situation in a recent
article in Jane' s Defence Weekly :
If the Soviets are keen to take out the northern
flank then they will need sea power to achieve that. It
cannot be achieved overland.
In order to take out north Norway and establish their
forces there they would have to come by sea. If we wish
to maintain Norway we also have got to maintain the
Norwegian Sea. S3
In addition to northern Norway, amphibious oper-
ations are also conceivable against Svalbard, Bear Island,
Jan Mayen Island, Iceland, the Faroes, and the Shet lands.
Because each of these islands is within the range of Soviet
airpower and with the exception of Iceland, they are either
lightly defended or not defended at all; the Soviets can
conduct operations against them at their own pace. In the
initial stages of a war, operations against these islands
are not likely because Soviet forces would have to concen-
trate their efforts on Norway, but once the Soviets are able
to establish bases in Norway, anything could happen.
^
The Soviets could also employ the Baltic Fleet
to achieve a double envelopment of the Scandinavian
Peninsula. This fleet, though smaller than the Northern
Fleet, has considerably more amphibious lift capacity, 65 and
S3 Geoffrey Manners, "NATO Commanders Criticise 'Split'
Proposal," Jane's Defence Weekly
,
4 May 1985, p. 739.
6
''Peter Whiteley, "Navies and the Northern Flank," in
Janejs 1981-1982 Naval Annual, ed . John Moore (New York:
Jane's Publishing, 19S1), pp. 107-108.
S5 John Moore, ed., Jane's Fighting Ships 1984-85
(London: Jane's Publishing, 1984)
, p . 497 .
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its own naval infantry brigade. Its 43 principal surface
combatants, 347 minor combatants, 170 auxiliaries, 33
submarines, and 270 aircraft 66 give it more than enough
firepower to capture the Danish Straits and join forces with
the Northern Fleet. In recent exercises the two fleets have
demonstrated the capability to isolate Scandinavia between
their two pincers and extend their deployment area out to
the GIUK gap. 67 Operations like these not only threaten
Norway, but Britain, Denmark, Holland and Belgium. It is
absolutely' essential for NATO to pursue a strategy that
prevents the Northern and Baltic Fleets from joining forces
and conducting combined operations.
With the Northern Fleet homeported on the Kola
Peninsula, it is easy to understand why Secretary Lehman
calls the Peninsula "the most valuable piece of real estate
on earth." 68 There is however, much more to his argument.
In general, the Soviet Navy's access to the Atlantic Ocean
is severely restricted by geography. Two of the three
Soviet fleets that are located near the Atlantic, the Baltic
Fleet and the Black Sea Fleet, must transit very narrow
choke-points enroute to the Atlantic. During peacetime
these choke-points are under NATO control and they will
surely be closed to the Soviets during war. Movement of the
Baltic Fleet is also limited by ice throughout most of the
winter. The Northern Fleet, on the other hand, operates
from the Kola Peninsula's warm water ports and has rela-
tively free access to the Atlantic. This freedom of move-
ment originally accounted for the concentration of over half
of the Soviet SSBN force in the Northern Fleet.
6 6 Soviet Military Power
,
p. 13.
S7 Whiteley, p. 107.
6 81
'Michael Getler, "Lehman Sees Kola Peninsula as a Key




Today, the Kola Peninsula's close proximity to
the Arctic provides the Soviet Union with a safe haven for
the Northern Fleet's Delta and Typhoon class SSBNs. These
SSBNs are equipped with extremely long range ballistic
missiles that allow them to operate from the waters of the
Barents Sea and Arctic Ocean. Because these submarines
comprise a large portion of the Soviet strategic nuclear
reserve force, the Soviets are very interested in guarding
their security. With operating areas in the marginal ice
zones and even under the Arctic ice, the SSBNs are protected
by layered defenses composed of attack submarines, surface
ships, and aircraft. These areas are referred to as
bastions and during wartime one of the first priorities of
the Northern Fleet would be to deploy to these bastions to
achieve defense-in-depth of their SSBNs. 69
The Kola Peninsula also plays a key role in the
Soviet strategic air defense system. There are 280 dedi-
cated air defense aircraft that are stationed throughout the
Arkhangelsk Air Defense District (ADD) which overlaps the
Kola Peninsula. As a part of this ADD, the Kola has 120 of
these aircraft assigned to its airfields. Fifty surface-to-
air missile (SAM) complexes with over 200 missile launchers
are also deployed on the Peninsula to protect key military
facilities and to guard the aircraft access routes to the
Russian heartland. 70 Soviet strategic air defenses are
concentrated along the main air corridors into the Soviet
s
"During wartime the U.S. Navy is planning to penetrate
these bastions and attack Soviet SSBNs under the Arctic ice.
Richard Halloran, "Navy Trains to Battle Soviet Submarines
in Arctic", New York Times
,
19 May 1983, p. A17 . For a
description of-these bastions and the Navy's plans see
Richard T. Ackley, "No Bastions for the Bear: Round 2.",
Proceedings 111 (April 1985J: 42-47; Ian Bellany, "SeaPower and the Soviet Submarine Forces," Survival 24
( January/February 1982): 2-7; and David B. Rivkm, Jr., "No




"International Institute for Strategic Studies, The
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Union and the purpose of these defenses is to intercept
American bombers and cruise missiles that are attacking the
Soviet Union. 71 What makes the Peninsula so important to
this system is that
It lies directly beneath the shortest flight path from
the United States to the demographic and industrial
heartland of the Soviet Union and its forward position
makes it a valuable base . . . for air defense forces. 72
Finally, the Soviets use the Kola Peninsula as
an auxiliary basing area for some of their strategic bomber
force. To perform their strategic missions against the
United States, Soviet bombers have to fly over the Arctic
enroute to their targets. The Kola provides a convenient
forward basing area for these bombers. This need to forward
base their bombers is especially true for the Backfire force
because this aircraft must refuel in flight to complete a
round-trip intercontinental mission. 73
b. The Northwestern TVD
In peacetime the forces assigned to the
Northwestern TVD are part of the the Leningrad Military
District (LMD). The Ground Forces of the District are under
the control of the Soviet 6th Army (stationed at
Petrozavodsk). Besides the headquarters for the 6th Army,
there are also two army corps headquarters located in the
District (27th Corps at Arkhangelsk and 30th Corps at
Vyborg). 7 '* These headquarters units will command the forces
assigned to the Northwestern TVD which will probably be
divided into two fronts. The latest unclassified sources
7 William J. Lewis, The Warsaw Pact: Arms Doctrine and
Strategy (n.p.: McGraw-HiTT Publications, 1982), p. 113.
72 Ries, p. 874.
73 Ibid.
7
"John Berg, "Soviet Front-Level Threat to Northern
Norway," Jane ' s Defence Weekly , 2 February 1985, p. 178.
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indicate that the Soviets have nine motor rifle divisions,
one airborne division, one artillery division, and an air
assault brigade allocated to the 6th Army. 75
On the Kola Peninsula the forces assigned to the
6th Army include the previously mentioned 45th Motor Rifle
Division near the border at Pechenga and the 54th Motor
Rifle Division in the Kandalaksha/Alakurtti area (see Figure
3.1). Both of these divisions are maintained in a high
state of readiness and they are heavily reinforced with
units that enhance their offensive capability. These divi-
sions are positioned near the most likely invasion routes
for northern Norway and therefore they are expected to form
the spearheads of the Soviet invasion forces. 76
The air assault brigade and the airborne divi-
sion (the 76th) are the types of units that the Soviets will
have to employ in northern Norway to defeat its defenders.
The climate and terrain of northern Norway make air mobility
critical to the advance of Soviet forces. There are also
reports that the Soviets have two Spetsnaz brigades in the
area. 77 These troops will undoubtedly be used to create
confusion behind Norwegian lines and their capabilities have
already been pointed out by Norwegian naval commanders who
insist that these troops are the only real threat to their
^International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 26.
A typical motor rifle division has 12,000 troops and 266
tanks while the airborne division has 7,000 troops. Lewis,
pp. 31-43.
7s The most likely invasion routes are directly through
Finmark and across the most northern part of Finland (this
area is known as the 'Finnish wedge' because it is wedged
between Norway and the Soviet Union) . An attack through
Finmark would essentially be a frontal assault along the
province's only road while an attack through the 'Finnish
wedge' would be an attempt to outflank the Norwegian
defenses in Troms . If the Soviets elect to attack through
Finland they would gain a significant advantage because
their forces could use roads that would take them to within
40 miles of the exposed flank of the Norwegian defense posi-
tions. John Berg, "Soviet Front-Level Threat to Northern
Norway," pp. 178-1/9. See also Bowman, pp. 93-98.
























(Source: Berg, "Soviet Front-Level Threat," p. 321.)
Figure 3.1 The Area of the Northwestern TVD.
coastal artillery fortresses. Together these
special-purpose units should give the 6th Army's motor rifle
divisions the necessary support that they need to carry a
successful invasion.
To provide air support for the operations of the
Ground Forces in the Leningrad Military District, there are
approximately 550 combat aircraft. About 300 of these
aircraft are helicopters that are assigned to Army Aviation
and the remaining 250 aircraft are part of the District's
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Air Force. 78 All of these assets are under the direct
control of the ground commander and they will figure heavily
in the success of any Soviet attack on Norway.
Of the 550 tactical aircraft in the Leningrad
Military District during peacetime, 130 are actually
stationed on the Kola Peninsula. This brings the total
number of aircraft on the Peninsula to about 650 (this total
includes Naval Aviation and Air Defense District aircraft)
or the equivalent of almost seven American aircraft
carriers. With this many aircraft on the Peninsula, one
would think that there would be a shortage of bases, but
there are over forty airfields on the Kola. What is even
more staggering is that the aircraft actually stationed on
the Kola Peninsula during peacetime only represent 50
percent of its capacity which means that the Soviets could
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"There are 145 fighter/ground attack aircraft, 30
reconnaissance, and 75 helicopters in the LMD ' s Air Force.
International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 26.
79 Sixteen of these airfields are all-weather and can
handle the largest Soviet aircraft, see Lewis, p. 294.
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During wartime the remaining motor rifle divi-
sions in the Leningrad Military District will be mobilized
and moved into positions to support the forces already
stationed on the Kola Peninsula. Together these forces will
give the Northwestern TVD a total strength of at least ten
divisions with 2,400 tanks, 2,100 artillery pieces, and 98
surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs). 80 Additional forces are
available from outside of the District and it is estimated
that the mobilization time for all of these forces would be
one to two weeks. 81 What this means is that "while an attack
'out of the blue' remains unlikely, a strike with the
limited objective of neutralizing northern Norway could be
mounted in six or seven days." 82 Senior Norwegian military
personnel estimate the Soviets could mount a successful
attack on northern Norway with essentially the forces that
they maintain during peacetime. They frankly state that
with an operational objective of occupying northern Norway
as rapidly as possible
Soviet forces would need from four to ten divisions,
including one naval-infantry brigade, up to one airborne
division, one or more air-assault regiments and army
level support forces .
.
, as well as up to 130
fighter/ground attack aircraft. 83
Table VII summarizes the forces available to
both sides during the initial stages of such an attack.
2 . Opportunities for Conflict
As previously stated the next aspect of the Soviet
threat to Norway has the most serious implications for NATO.
Because of Norway's close proximity to the Soviet Union, it
is extremely vulnerable to Soviet attack. This
8
"International Institute for Strategic Studies p. 26.

















* 15 Brigades- three brigades per division
** Includes all aircraft stationed in the Leningrad
Military District.
vulnerability becomes critical when viewed in the context of
several disputes that have dominated Soviet-Norwegian rela-
tions for a number of years. These disputes are similar to
problems encountered by many neighboring countries, but they
take on much greater significance because of the impact they
could have on the possibility of conflict between NATO and
the Warsaw Pact. If the Soviets choose to impose their will
on the Norwegians and elect to resolve any of these disputes
by exercising their vast military superiority, the ensuing
conflict could drag NATO into a direct confrontation with
the Soviet Union.
There are three major areas of disagreement between
the Soviet Union and Norway: control of the Svalbard
Archipelago (including the Spitzbergen group of islands,
Bear^Island, and Hopen Island), the exploitation of offshore
resources (particularly fish and oil), and the continental
shelf dividing line. Each of these disputes have strategic,
economic, and political implications that could easily lead
to a crisis, but so far both countries have demonstrated a
willingness to negotiate and exercise restraint. The ques-
tion is--How long will the Soviets accept the status quo?
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a. Svalbard
Under the Svalbard Treaty of 1920, Norway has




* All 41 signatories to the Treaty have the
right to mine, fish, and hunt on the Archipelago, but only
the Soviet Union exercises that right. With permanent
communities in the Spitzbergen mining towns of Barentsburg
and Pyramiden (see Figure 3.2) totalling about 2,600 people,
the Soviets out-number their Norwegian hosts by more than
two to one. 85 Coal mining is the stated reason for the
Soviet presence on Spitzbergen, but "it is worth noting that
the coal extraction of the Russians is considerably
less-400,000 tons yearly- than that of the Norwegians 86 .
Despite the apparent economic reasons for the
Soviet presence, there is little doubt that the real Soviet
interest in these islands is strategic in nature. As the
central pillar of the gap through which the Soviet Northern
Fleet must pass to get to the North Atlantic, the geo-
strategic significance of Svalbard is obvious. When consid-
ering its location in relation to the Soviet SSBN bastions
in the Barents Sea, the Archipelago takes on even greater
importance. Soviet recognition of the strategic importance
of Svalbard can be linked to an attempt by the Soviet
government to have the Svalbard Treaty revoked in 1944. 87
What the Soviets sought, and continue to seek up to the
present, is the establishment of a Soviet-Norwegian condo-
minium to administer Svalbard and sovereignty over Bear
Island. The Norwegians were able to reject the Soviet
8
''Amundsen, p. 12.
85 There are approximately 1,200 Norwegians on
Spitzbergen at Longyearbyen. The purpose of the community





















(Source: Amundsen, p. 17.)
Figure 3.2 Svalbard.
demands because of the U.S. policy of containment and are
now protected by their membership in NATO.
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The Svalbard Treaty also bans military installa-
tions and stipulates that the territories ". . . may never
be used for military purposes." 88 The Norwegians strictly
adhere to the provisions of the Treaty and as the sovereign
power they are responsible for the laws that govern
Svalbard. However, the record clearly shows that the
Soviets have frequently and systematically violated both the
provisions of the Treaty as well as Norwegian laws. These
violations are interpreted as a strong Soviet challenge to
Norwegian authority on the Islands.
The most notable example of the tension created
by these violations occurred in 1978 when a Soviet Tu-126
radar plane (the same basic type of aircraft as the. U.S.
AWACS) crashed on Hopen Island. At that time Norwegian
concerns about Soviet military related activities on
Svalbard were on the rise. The Norwegians were particularly
suspicious about the mission of the aircraft because they
had recently uncovered a covert Soviet attempt to construct
an • airstrip and radar installation at Kapp Heer near
Barentsburg. When the plane's flight recorder was recovered
by the local Norwegians, Soviet commandos attempted to go
ashore and forcibly take it back. A Norwegian gunboat had
to prepare to fire on the Soviets to keep them from
landing. 89 This leads one to wonder what the Norwegians
would have done if the Soviets had not backed down,
b. Resource Competition
The Barents and Norwegian Seas are rich with
resources that are important not only to Norway, but also to
the Soviet Union. As a result of this situation, exploita-
tion of these resources is a major source of controversy.
Fish is a mainstay of the Nordic diet and it is an important
source of protein for the Soviet people. Because of the
88 Ibid.
89 Leighton, p. 17.
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abundance of fish found in these seas, they are important
fishing areas for both countries. Soviet fishing activities
in these waters have been so extensive that they threaten
Norwegian supplies.
It has been reported that the Barents and Norwegian Seas
provide for more than 300,000 tons of the Soviet
northern fisheries fleet's annual catch of something
over one million tons. 90
During the late 1970' s, the Soviet threat to
Norway's fish supply became so great that the Norwegians had
to take action to protect their interests. The Norwegians
extended their fisheries limit and they established a
200-mile economic zone in accordance with the Law of the Sea
Conference in 1977.
In addition to the abundant supply of fish found
in the Barents and Norwegian Seas, substantial oil and gas
reserves have also been discovered on the continental shelf
beneath these seas. "One estimate is that Barents Sea oil
reserves may be up to twice as large as proven North Sea
reserves." 91 These reserves represent a considerable find
for the West, but they are located in a region that is
particularly sensitive to the Soviets. Although the Soviets
will undoubtedly explore the potential of the reserves in
their part of the shelf, they have already expressed
displeasure with the idea of international oil companies
exploiting Norwegian reserves in the Barents. 92
90 Kenneth A. Myers, North Atlantic Security : The
Forgotten Flank ?
,
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c. The Grey Zone
The third major area of controversy between
Norway and the Soviet Union is the location of the conti-
nental shelf dividing line. There is no agreement between
the two parties over the appropriate method for determining
the boundary and the area of disagreement (over 57,900
square miles) has become known as the Grey Zone. Figure 3.3
shows the difference between the two principles with the
heavy line being the Median Line and the thin line being the
Sector Line.
Negotiations between Norway and the Soviet Union
to settle this dispute were started in the early 1970' s, and
a temporary agreement (the Grey Zone Agreement) was reached
in 1977. 93 The Norwegians base their position in this
dispute on the Continental Shelf Convention of 1958 which
states that the 'Median Line Principle' will be used if the
parties are unable to agree on the boundary of the shelf. 9 ^
Even though the Soviets ratified the 1958 Convention, they
refuse to accept its solution to the problem. They insist
on the 'Sector Principle' which is based on a 1926 unilat-
eral decree that claims complete Soviet sovereignty "
.
over all lands, islands, and ice within the sector line
between Northern Russia and the North Pole." 95 The Norwegian
position is obviously more legitimate, but the Grey Zone
Agreement represents tacit approval of the Soviet position
by Norway.
A Soviet military solution for any one of these
disputes is highly unlikely at the present time because of





''"The technical definition of a median line: a line,
every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points
on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial
seas of each of two coastal states is measured." Myers, p.
49.
95 Amundsen, p. 13.
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(Source: Amundsen, p. 14.)
Figure 3.3 The Grey Zone.
this does not remove the threat. What these disputes really
give Moscow are opportunities to exert pressure on the
Norwegian government by manipulating the internal political
forces that favor neutrality and avoidance of friction with
the Soviet Union at all costs.
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3 . A Neutralized Norway
The Soviets appear to be pursuing a peacetime stra-
tagem on the Northern Flank that is aimed at neutralizing
Norway and maintaining or improving their already consider-
able military superiority in the region. Their deception
plan is based on an all-out political offensive that is
designed to exploit traditional Norwegian isolationist and
anti-nuclear tendencies. With the military forces on the
Kola Peninsula as a source of leverage; the Soviets are
employing propaganda, agents of influence, espionage, and
covert military operations against Norway to achieve what
could be a decisive advantage in the region. Their imme-
diate aim is to militarily isolate Norway from the United
States and the rest of NATO. This sense of isolation allows
the Soviets to exercise undue influence over Norwegian
national security policy-making which in itself perpetuates
the process. This strategy is consistent with the overall
approach that the Soviets have followed in Scandinavia since
the end of World War II.
. . . throughout the post-war years Moscow has sought
to weaken Scandinavian ties with the West and to make of
Northern Europe a sort of neutral, ideally pro-Soviet,
extension of the buffer zone which is created by force
in the Baltic Republics and Eastern Europe. 35
The long-term goal of the Soviet stratagem is to get
Norway out of NATO before the outbreak of a major East-West
war. By achieving this goal the Soviets would reduce NATO's
control over the movements of the Northern Fleet, improve
the defensive posture of the Kola Peninsula, and greatly
increase their threat to NATO's Northern Flank. The mili-
tary build-up on the Kola Peninsula is the key element of
the Soviet effort to achieve this goal. The forces assem-
bled by Moscow on the Peninsula send a clear signal to Oslo
"German, p. 55.
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that accommodation with the Soviet Union is Norway's only
course of action. To take this line of thinking to the
extreme, the worst-case scenario for NATO would be
If the USSR s expanding naval power, increasingly
offensive-oriented airpower, and ground forces in the
region convince the Nordic countries that U.S. power
4,000 miles distant is no match for Soviet strength in
flace, the war could be lost even before a shot is
ired. 97
Realizing that Norway's withdrawal from NATO is not
likely to happen in the very near future, the Soviets are
pursuing the short-term goal of maintaining or improving
their already considerable military advantage in the region.
If war is 'forced' on the Soviets by the West before Norway
has been neutralized, the Soviets would ideally like to take
Norway out at minimal cost. To accomplish this objective
the Soviets manipulate the 'Nordic Balance' to their own
advantage. The Nordic Balance is a concept that implies
maintenance of the the status quo in the region. What it
really means in Scandinavia is that the Soviets will
continue to show restraint concerning their relationship
with Finland as long as the other Nordic members of NATO
continue to restrict their participation in the Alliance.
State Secretary Hoist describes this situation as follows:
It is recognized in all Nordic capitals that decisions
amounting to major deviations from the established
pattern could alter the calculus in the other Nordic
countries and the external pressures which influence
that calculus. 98
Military diplomacy is the term that best describes
the Soviet efforts to exert pressure on the Norwegians.
Through the military build-up on the Kola, the Soviets hope
97 Leighton, p. 95
98 Holst, p. 63.
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to erode Norwegian political and military self-confidence.
Along with this erosion of self-confidence, they also hope
to erode Norway's confidence in NATO and its ability to
provide assistance in a crisis situation. This erosion of
confidence helps to isolate Norway from the West and it
increases the influence that the Soviets have on Norwegian
policy-making. If they are not challenged by Norway and
NATO, the Soviets will continue
pursuing long-range objectives patiently and
persistently: applying alternating waves of threat;
cajoling, and banishment; supplementing diplomatic pres-
sures with propaganda efforts to stimulate domestic
pressures on governments; and using the unilateral
concessions of neighbors as levers for obtaining still
more concessions from them. 39
The three following examples of Soviet interference
in Norwegian affairs provide helpful insight into the Soviet
peacetime offensive in Norway. In each case the Soviets
manipulated the Nordic Balance to suit their propaganda
needs and flagrantly employed military diplomacy to force
the Norwegians to make concessions. Under these pressures
the best that Norway and NATO could hope for was to break
even.
a. A Nordic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
Since the late 1950 's the Soviet Union has
pushed for a Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) that
would include all of the Scandinavian countries, but exclude
the Soviet Union. Although the basic idea appeals to the
Norwegians, each proposal for a Nordic NWFZ has been consis-
tently rejected by Norway because the proposals fail to
include the Soviets.
President Kekkonen of Finland assumed a leader-
ship role in these efforts to achieve a Nordic NWFZ. His
latest proposal in May 1978, had very serious implications
"Ibid.
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for Norway and NATO because it sought to extend the ban on
nuclear weapons into wartime. 100 This would mean that NATO's
response to a Soviet attack on Norway would be limited to
conventional means and all deterrence in the region would be
based solely on the threat of NATO reinforcements.
Realizing the advantage that acceptance of this
proposal would give them, the Soviets expended considerable
effort to sway Norwegian public opinion. The effort of
their propaganda machine was so successful that by the
spring of 1981 the ruling Labor Party had decided to endorse
a Nordic NWFZ despite the negative impact it would have on
NATO's ability to deter an attack on Norway. Surprisingly,
the Labor government even indicated that it was prepared to
extend the ban on nuclear weapons into wartime without
restrictions on Soviet weapons.
At this time elections were being held in Norway
and the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev went so far as to hint
that the Soviet Union might be prepared to accept some
restrictions on its own nuclear weapons in the region if a
NWFZ was accepted by the Nordic countries. All of these
efforts were for naught because the Conservative Party won
enough seats during the election to form a coalition govern-
ment and effectively block any NWFZ proposal with a one vote
majority. x ° l
b. NATO Exercises in Norway
Since the early 1960's, the Soviets have consis-
tently protested regular NATO exercises in northern Norway,
".
. . calling them provocative, threatening, and-of course-
violations of Norway's base policy." 102 These protests took
10 Leighton, p. 39-40
10 In 1982, the Norwegian nuclear disarmament movement
collected 540,000 signatures for a Nordic NWFZ and the Labor
Party came out with a strong nuclear freeze program. Nils
P. Gleditsch, "The Freeze in Norway," Bulletin or the Atomic
Scientists 39 (November 1983): 32-34. "
102 German, p. 70.
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on an added dimension in 1977, when Soviet leaders expressed
considerable displeasure with NATO plans to include a 1,500
man West German contingent in upcoming ACE Mobile Force
exercises in Northern Norway. 103 This deployment of German
troops to Norway represented the continuation of a trend
that had been established in the mid- 1970' s, but under
Soviet pressure the Norwegian government reversed its posi-
tion and vetoed the participation of the West German combat
unit. 10 '*
c. The Prepositioning of NATO War Supplies
The debate over whether or not to preposition
the heavy equipment for the U.S. MAB is another example of
Soviet interference in Norwegian politics. Prepositioning
the MAB ' s heavy equipment would reduce its deployment time
from weeks to days. Successful implementation of this
program would strengthen deterrence, improve Norway's
defenses, and significantly reduce NATO transport require-
ments for Norway. Soviet propaganda again played a major
role in the public debate. In September 1980, a poll was
taken concerning this issue and an overwhelming majority (78
percent) of respondents believed that it was impossible to
defend northern Norway without prestocking Allied equipment.
Despite this consensus of opinion, only 58 percent of the
population actually supported stockpiling NATO equipment in
Norway. 105 As a result of Soviet influence, the equipment
for the Brigade was stockpiled in central Norway instead of
northern Norway where it was really needed.
1 ° 3 Leighton, pp. 26-27.
10
"German, pp. 71-72.
105 Amundsen, p. 43.
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IV. FOR THE DEFENSE OF NORWAY: NATO ' S STRATEGIC OPTIONS
The strategic imperative on NATO's Northern Flank is the
defense of Norway. It is essential to recognize that Norway
is the key to the Flank and that NATO must provide for its
defense. If NATO fails to provide for a credible defense of
Norway, it invites Soviet aggression in the northern region
which could lead to World War III.
Based on the strategic situation as it is described in
chapter 3, the fundamental goals of NATO on the Northern
Flank are deterrence, the defense of Norway, and the protec-
tion of the North Atlantic SLOCs . The task of NATO's stra-
tegic planners is to determine the most effective means of
achieving these goals. It is believed that the first step
in this process should be to ascertain what tasks (or stra-
tegic objectives) are necessary to achieve these goals.
After this determination of objectives, various strategic
options can be evaluated relative to their specific accom-
plishment of these tasks. An objective analysis of the
advantages and disadvantages of each strategic option is
critical to the process. Political, economic, and other
pertinent constraints must also be considered, but it is
important not to lose sight of the ultimate goals. In the
end this process should lead to the formulation of a
strategy that meets the objectives and achieves the goals.
A. FUNDAMENTAL STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
There are two basic strategic objectives that must be
addressed by any NATO strategy on the Northern Flank.
First, the strategy must provide for sufficient reinforce-
ments early enough in a crisis to deter Soviet aggression or
to defeat an invasion if deterrence fails. Second, the
strategy must provide a means of achieving control of the
Norwegian Sea to maintain the war effort in Norway. If
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these two objectives are met by a strategy, all three of the
stated goals should be achieved by NATO in the region.
1. Adequate and Timely Reinforcement
Because of Norway's self-imposed restrictions on its
participation in NATO, a credible Norwegian deterrent is
contingent upon NATO's ability to provide reinforcements
during a crisis situation. A NATO capability to reinforce
Norway with sufficient forces early in a crisis not only
supports deterrence, but it also enhances Norway's defense
if deterrence fails.
To make deterrence work on the Northern Flank, it is
important that non-Norwegian NATO troops are sent to Norway
during the early stages of a crisis. This step should be
taken so that it is clear to the Soviets that an attack on
Norway is an attack on NATO. Even a small force with rela-
tively limited firepower (ACE Mobile Force) would demon-
strate NATO's resolve and strengthen deterrence. State
Secretary Hoist describes this relationship as follows:
Establishing a high probability of having to fight
non-Norwegian forces at an early stage of an attack on
Norway is considered particularly important from the
point of view of raising the risk level. 106
Because of the geography of Norway, the defense of
northern Norway is the key to the defense of the rest of the
country. The terrain in the north provides a natural
barrier that more than makes up for the numerical inferi-
ority of its defenders. Unfortunately, the situation
changes further south in central Norway where the terrain
advantage is essentially lost. If the Soviets are able to
break-through Norwegian defenses in the north, there will be
little left to prevent them from over-running the rest of
the country. According to the assessment of General Bowman,
106 Holst, p. 70.
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the Norwegians will be successful in the north if they are
able to reinforce at half the Soviet rate. Initially, they
should be able to achieve this rate of reinforcement, but
without large numbers of NATO ground and air reinforcements
this rate cannot be sustained by the Norwegians alone.
"Norwegian capacity to hold out alone against a Soviet
attack is estimated to be three weeks." 107
This situation leads to the long war versus short
war debate which is just as critical to the strategic situ-
ation on the Northern Flank as it is to the situation on the
Central Front. What makes the two situations much different
is that the forces in Norway would have a distinct advantage
in a short war scenario. Norway's terrain and climate are
such an advantage for its defenders that even under ideal
weather conditions it will take the Soviets several days to
arrive at the main Norwegian defense line in Troms . If the
Norwegians have adequate warning and they are able to mobi-
lize their reserves before the Soviets actually start their
offensive, the Soviet advance on Troms could take weeks and
it would be very costly in men and material.
There are three aspects of the reinforcement effort
in Norway that are essential to the successful defense of
the country. First, the Norwegians must control the
airspace above northern Norway to allow for movement of
their own reserves to the north. Without control of the air
above northern Norway, reinforcement by air becomes
doubtful. Second, NATO must provide sufficient aircraft
reinforcements early enough in the campaign to make up for
Norwegian losses and to maintain control of Norwegian
airspace. These aircraft are necessary to keep Norwegian
airfields operational and to protect their coastal SLOCs
.
The aircraft involved will also be critically needed to
support Norwegian forces fighting on the ground and at sea.
107 Ries, "Defending the Far North," p. 879.
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Finally, NATO ground reinforcements must arrive in adequate
numbers to shift the balance on the ground in favor of the
Alliance and to overcome initial Soviet gains. It is also
critical that these reinforcements are equipped and trained
to fight in Norway's harsh conditions so that they can make
a real contribution to the defense effort.
2. Control of the Norwegian Sea
Control of the sea (or sea control) is the essential
element of seapower and history tells us that it can only be
decisively achieved by defeating the enemy's naval
forces. 108 This approach to achieving control of the sea is
endorsed by the U.S. Navy and it not only guides its opera-
tional planning, but also its procurement policies. A March
1982, Congressional Budget Office Report on the '600-Ship
Navy' states the Navy's position on this issue as follows:
The Navy believes that the most efficient way to gain
and maintain control of the seas during wartime would be
to destroy hostile forces capable of challenging that
control. This would include frontal assaults against
Soviet naval forces and their supporting bases in Soviet
home waters. Aircraft carrier battle groups would be
the instrument of such offensive action. 09used as
To achieve sea control in a given area of the
world's oceans, a naval force must be capable of exercising
control over its environment above, below, and on the
surface of the sea. This multi-environment aspect of sea
control is often ignored or misunderstood by people who are
are unfamiliar with naval strategy. It is for this reason
that submarines are not by themselves considered to be sea
control platforms because of their inability to control the
airspace above the surface. On the other hand, the modern
10
"Geoffrey Till, Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), pp.-9T-TTO.
109 U.S., Congress, Congressional Budget Office, Building
a 600-Ship Navy: Costs, Timing
,
and Alternative Approaches ^
by Peter J . Tarpgaard (Washington"; D . CTT Government Printing
Office, March 1982) p. 6.
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aircraft carrier with attack, fighter, and ASW aircraft
embarked is considered the ideal sea control platform
because of its ability to achieve control in all warfare
environments. When the aircraft carrier is combined with a
powerful array of surface and submarine escorts, it becomes
the most potent sea control force in the world. Admiral
James D. Watkins , the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), who
is himself a submariner, assesses the sea control capability
of the aircraft carrier and its battle group as follows:
The carrier battle group - with its ability to assert
control across the four dimensions of surface, subsur-
face, air and land warfare - is the sine qua non of
modern sea power. l °
What is important to recognize about sea control is
that it is not an end in itself, but a means to achieve an
ultimate objective. In the case of NATO and the Norwegian
Sea, sea control is necessary to reinforce and resupply
Norway during a war with the Soviet Union. Additionally,
control of the Norwegian Sea will also severely limit Soviet
access to the North Atlantic. If deterrence fails, the
basic goals of NATO in the northern region are to defend
Norway and the North Atlantic SLOCs . Control of the
Norwegian Sea will enable the Alliance to achieve both of
these goals. The view is that the battle for the control of
the Norwegian Sea will largely determine the outcome of the
battle for the Atlantic SLOCs. Admiral Wesley L. McDonald,
the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT), describes
this relationship as follows:
. . . SACLANT stands on the fact that he is commited to
reinforce and resupply Europe. That is our primary
mission and one of the requirements, as I perceive it,
is the reinforcement of Norway. As we do that we are
110 James D. Watkins, Sea Power - the Carrier Battle
Group," NATO's Sixteen Nations, special issue 1 (1984), p.
100.
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foing to have to project forces into the Norwegian Sea.
then find myself in a situation where the battle for
the Norwegian Sea and the Battle for the Atlantic are
inextricably entwined; there is no way of separating one
from the other. 111
The essence of this discussion about sea control is
that "given Soviet priorities and NATO capabilities, sea
control can be established more rapidly by going after the
Soviet Fleet rather than awaiting their attack." 112 What
this means in the Norwegian Sea is that the U.S. Navy, using
its carrier battle groups and with the assistance of the
maritime forces of its NATO Allies, would like to seek a
decisive battle with the Soviet Northern Fleet. If the Navy
is successful in this battle, it will move forward to
contain the Northern Fleet in the Barents Sea and strike at
its bases on the Kola Peninsula. When this process is
complete NATO will have control of the Norwegian Sea and the
Alliance's maritime forces will be free to support opera-
tions ashore.
B. STRATEGIC OPTIONS IN THE NORTHERN REGION
There are four basic strategic options available to NATO
in the northern region of the Northern Flank. The first and
most obvious option, is an expansion of NATO's means of
deterrence. If Norway would revoke its self-imposed basing
restrictions, both for foreign troops and nuclear weapons,
NATO could employ the same deterrent options in Norway that
it does on the Central Front. This approach appears to be
the most logical solution to the problem, but it is also the
least likely to be implemented because of political
constraints
.
NATO's second basic option is a strategy that is aimed
at reducing the time involved in reinforcing Norway. This
lxl Derek Wood, "Soviets Expand Maritime Air Power,
Jane's Defence Weekly
,
20 April 1985, p. 652.
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approach recognizes the political constraints in Norway and
seeks to address the problem within the framework outlined
by Minister of Defense Hauge in 1951. The main thrust of
this strategy is centered on increasing the amount of prepo-
sitioned war supplies in Norway which would significantly
reduce the deployment time and sea lift requirements of
NATO's reinforcements.
The third basic strategic alternative is a defensive
strategy that accepts Soviet dominance of the Norwegian Sea
and concentrates NATO's naval forces south of the GIUK gap
to protect the North Atlantic SLOCs . A maritime barrier at
the GIUK gap is the centerpiece of this strategy. The
barrier, made up of maritime patrol aircraft, nuclear-
powered attack submarines (SSNs), and land-based air defense
aircraft, will be deployed to hold Soviet submarines and
strike aircraft north of the Gap. NATO carrier battle
groups will be employed south of the Gap as sea control
forces to protect the SLOCs. Additional NATO submarines
will carry out a sea denial campaign against the Soviets in
the Norwegian Sea.
A forward defense that challenges the Soviet Northern
Fleet in the Norwegian Sea is the final strategic option
available to NATO. It is articulated in the U.S. Navy's
Maritime Strategy and it is essentially the strategy that
NATO has employed in the Northern Region since the beginning
of the Alliance. Opponents of this strategy insist that it
is no longer viable^ because the Alliance has lost its
ability to project its maritime power into the Norwegian
Sea.
1. Elimination of Norwegian Basing Restrictions
The basic strategic problem for NATO on the Northern
Flank is the maintenance of an effective deterrent in the
region. Norway's basing restrictions effectively limit the
range of NATO's deterrent options to the threat of rein-
forcement during a crisis and the possible use of nuclear
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weapons during a major war. Currently, reinforcement and
resupply of Norway depends on NATO's capability to control
the Norwegian Sea and the massive Soviet military build-up
on the Kola Peninsula threatens that capability. The
Soviets realize that
NATO's commitment to defend Norway could be met only if
the Norwegians themselves, in the first instance,
requested Allied reinforcements to deter or repel an
attack, and then only if the Allies were able to respond
rapidly and effectively. Moscow's long-range efforts
are directed toward assuring that neither of these
conditions could be met. 113
If the Norwegians were to remove their restrictions
on the basing of foreign troops and/or nuclear weapons, then
NATO's capability to deter Soviet aggression in the region
would be greatly enhanced. In fact, revocation of the
basing restrictions could eliminate the need for reinforce-
ments completely while at the same time improving the
overall Norwegian defense posture. With contingents of
non-Norwegian troops and aircraft based in Norway along with
their nuclear weapons, the need for immediate reinforcements
would no longer exist. The campaign to establish control of
the Norwegian Sea could be delayed until the submarine
threat to American carrier battle groups is reduced. This
delay would allow NATO maritime forces to concentrate on
other problems, at least at the beginning of the war.
While the implementation of this strategy in Norway
would great 1^ enhance deterrence and defense on the Northern
Flank, internal Norwegian opposition to the plan makes it
unrealistic as a strategic option. The depth of Norwegian
opposition to the revocation of the restrictions cannot be
over-emphasized. Public outcry against the prepositioning
of NATO war supplies is a clear indication of where the
Norwegians would stand on this issue. Even though the
1
x
3 German, p. 56
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Norwegian people recognize the need to improve their
defenses, they clearly would not accept the basing of
foreign troops to accomplish this improvement at the present
time.
Public opposition to the basing of nuclear weapons
in Norway could be expected to be even stronger than the
opposition to the basing of foreign troops. It has already
been pointed out that in 1982, the Norwegian Labor Party was
ready to accept a Soviet proposal for a Nordic Nuclear
Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) that includes all Scandinavian coun-
tries, but excludes the Soviet Union. They were even
willing to extend the ban on nuclear weapons into a war
between NATO and the Warsaw Pact without similar concessions
from the Soviets. Although it is true that the Labor Party
has not benefited from this position by regaining control of
the Government, there is little consolation in the fact that
the Conservative Party currently controls the Government.
The Conservatives can only count on a narrow majority in the
Storting on nuclear issues and they consistently trail Labor
in the polls . * x k
Another crucial factor in this assessment is the
role of Soviet Union influence in Norwegian decision-making.
Unquestionably, the Soviets would interpret the revocation
of the basing restrictions as an act of aggression. Since
the imposition of the restrictions by the Norwegians ". .
the Soviets have consistently chosen to regard the base
policy as a binding obligation." 115
2. Increased Prepositioning of NATO War Supplies
Since agreeing to the prepositioning of the heavy
equipment for the U.S. Marine Amphibious Brigade in 1981,
considerable progress has been made to improve the stock-
piles of prepositioned NATO equipment and war supplies.
1 14 Gleditsch, pp. 33-34.
115 German, p. 62.
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Unfortunately, the heavy equipment for the CAST Brigade, the
only earmarked ground reinforcements for Norway, is not yet
prepositioned although negotiations are underway. 116
Increasing these stockpiles in Norway could greatly improve
NATO's deterrent posture in the region, but the political
constraints cannot be ignored.
At first glance it appears that stockpiling of war
supplies and heavy equipment could solve many of Norway's
defensive problems. It allows the rapid and relatively
secure deployment of NATO's reinforcements which greatly
enhances deterrence. The need for strategic warning would
be reduced and if deterrence fails, these forces could be in
position at the outbreak of a war instead of in the middle
of the North Atlantic on slow moving troop transports.
There are however, problems with a strategy that
relies to heavily on the prepositioning of war supplies.
The first major problem is the vulnerability of the stock-
piled equipment to Soviet attack. It would be unrealistic
to think that the Soviets would not attack the storage areas
for the prepositioned equipment. Although these facilities
are being constructed to reduce their vulnerability to air
attack, there is still the threat to Spetsnaz initiated
sabotage as well as airborne assault. These large storage
areas are in themselves incentives for a Soviet surprise
attack. If such an attack were successful, NATO reinforce-
ments would lack the arms, equipment, and ammunition that
they would need to make the necessary contribution to the
defense of Norway.
A second problem with prepositioning of NATO war
supplies in Norway is the threat posed by Soviet long-range
strike assets (aircraft, missiles, and air-mobile troops) to
the Norwegian terminals of the air bridge across the North
Atlantic. If the Soviets are able to put Norway's airfields
116 Belzile, p. 24.
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out of action at the beginning of a war, then NATO's
reinforcements will have no place to land. Surely, the
Soviets recognize the importance of Norway's airfields to
NATO's reinforcement plans. Norway's airfields will
undoubtedly be subjected to repeated attacks by the Soviets.
These attacks could mean that NATO's reinforcements may
never make it into Norway unless they are in position at the
outbreak of hostilities.
Another related consideration is the Soviet capa-
bility to intercept the airliners that are flying the troops
into Norway. The latest generation of Soviet fighter
aircraft has the range capability to make such a threat
possible. If the Soviets are able to capture airfields in
northern Norway, NATO reinforcement by air would become a
very risky undertaking. A successful Soviet airlane inter-
diction campaign could prove to be a reality and it would be
very costly for NATO.
The vulnerability of the prepositioned equipment and
the terminals of the airbridge are problems that can be
reduced by hardening of the storage areas and improving the
survivability of the airfields. If NATO receives adequate
warning and its reinforcements are in position at the start
of war, these vulnerabilities can be completely overcome.
Even with reduced vulnerability and adequate warning, this
strategy fails to directly address the issue of controlling
the Norwegian Sea. As an independent strategy, it should
not be endorsed as a solution to NATO's problems on the
Northern Flank. Because of its capability to strengthen
deterrence, it should be incorporated into any strategy that
is employed by NATO in the region.
3 . A Defensive Barrier at the GIUK Gap
In the late 1970' s, when American naval power was at
lowest point since the end of World War II, a defensive
strategy based on a maritime barrier at the GIUK gap
appeared to be NATO's only strategic alternative on the
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Northern Flank. It was rationalized that NATO no longer had
the naval forces that it needed to simultaneously control
the Norwegian Sea and protect the North Atlantic SLOCs . The
implications of this apparent lack of capability caused
considerable controversy in the United States and NATO. The
New York Times reported this change in strategy as follows:
The Navy, balancing present and future resources against
its tasks in a global war with the Soviet Union, has
concluded that two of its major missions, establishing
lines of communication and supply across the Atlantic to
Europe and achieving control in the Norwegian Sea area,
must be carried out sequentially rather than
simultaneously. x l 7
The basic problem was that NATO simply lacked the
necessary escorts (destroyers and frigates) to simultane-
ously defend convoys and control the Norwegian Sea.
Unfortunately, this shortage of escorts still exists today
and the extent of this shortage was revealed by Admiral Sir
William Staveley, Commander-in-Chief Channel (CINCHAN) , in
1984. Admiral Staveley disclosed that the Atlantic and
Channel command areas were fifty percent short of escorts
and were even worse off for mine counter-measure vessels. 118
The shortage of escorts coupled with the quantitative and
qualitative improvements in the Soviet Navy during the
1970 's alarmed Western strategic planners enough to cause a
'circle the wagons' mentality to become prevalent.
Soviet submarines and long-range strike aircraft are
the main threats to the North Atlantic SLOCs. Of these
threats the submarines are considered to be the most diffi-
cult problem for the Alliance simply because of the uncer-
tain nature of ASW and the sheer numbers of Soviet
117 Drew Middleton, "Navy Sees Limit on Ability in
Atlantic War," New York Times, 20 February 1980, p. A6
.
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submarines that are available. Admiral McDonald frankly
states that
If the Soviet Northern Fleet submarine force is not
contained north of the GIUK gap then the battle for the
Atlantic and ultimately the defense of Western Europe
would become critical. 1
The major components of this strategy are designed
specifically to counter these threats through a layered
defense of the SLOCs . In the first NATO defensive layer,
SSNs would carry out a sea denial campaign in the Norwegian
Sea. Their primary purpose would be to attrite the Northern
Fleet, concentrating on its submarines, to reduce its offen-
sive capability. The second layer would be the barrier at
the GIUK gap. This barrier would be composed of SSNs, mari-
time patrol aircraft, and land-based air defense intercep-
tors. Their main purpose would be the attrition of Soviet
forces attempting to enter the North Atlantic. The forces
employed along the barrier could be augmented by ASW mine-
fields and carrier-based aircraft which would be operating
in a supporting role. Carrier battle groups performing a
sea control mission along the SLOCs would provide the next
layer of defense. Their purpose would be to act as a mobile
reserve force to counter any Soviet forces that penetrate
the first two layers. The final defensive layer would be
provided by the naval forces that are actually escorting the
convoys. Many analysts consider the convoy and its escorts
to be the most effective system for countering subma-
rines. 12 ° The effectiveness of the ASW protection provided
119 Robert Hutchinson and Antony Preston, "Port Mining
Threat Launches New Look at Reinforcement Plans,' Jane s
Defence Weekly
, 14 January 1984, p. 5.
120 This conclusion is derived from the experiences of
World War I and II where the convoy was established as the
best method of protecting merchant shipping. E. J. Grove,
"The Convoy Debate," Naval Forces
,
no. 3 (1985), p. 41.
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by the convoy's escorts could prove once again to be the
decisive factor in the World War III version of the battle
for the Atlantic.
Currently, the most senior American naval leaders
reject a defensive strategy that calls for a maritime
barrier at the GIUK gap with no insertion of U.S. aircraft-
carrier battle groups into the Norwegian Sea. The Secretary
of the Navy, John F. Lehman; the Chief of Naval Operations,
Admiral Watkins ; andthe Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic,
Admiral McDonald; all have spoken out strongly against such
a strategy.
There are three fundamental problems with a defen-
sive maritime strategy on the Northern Flank. First and
foremost among these problems is the fact that the strategy
concedes the Norwegian Sea to the Soviets. Based on the
forces that the Soviet Union has available in the region and
recent Soviet exercises in the area, it is clear that the
Soviet Northern Fleet will attempt to establish control of
the Norwegian Sea very early in any conflict with NATO. If
NATO's response to this Soviet move is a defensive barrier
at the GIUK gap, the Norwegians will essentially find them-
selves behind Soviet lines and isolated from their allies.
This isolation could lead to the fall of Norway and disaster
for NATO. resistance. Admiral McDonald, (SACLANT), offered
the following analysis of a GIUK gap barrier defense in
Jane ' s Defence Weekly :
I just cannot build a barrier at the
Greenland-Iceland-UK gap and not go into the Norwegian
Sea. That allows the Soviets too much freedom in the
Norwegian Sea and probably forecloses the fact that
Norway is going to come under great pressure and may in
fact collapse under that pressure. Therefore you lose
the flanks and you may, in fact, lose the battle for the
Atlantic. l 21
121 Derek Wood, "Soviets Expand Maritime Air Power,"
Jane's Defence Weekly
,
20 April 1985, p. 652.
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Secretary Lehman, the Navy's leading advocate for an
offensive strategy, shares Admiral McDonald's assessment of
the Soviet threat in the Norwegian Sea and the impact that
it could have on NATO's Atlantic SLOCs . He asserts that
Nato s answer to this threat cannot be simply to
throw a passive barrier across the GIUK . . . Gap. We
must be able to prevent the Soviets from gaining the
initiative on the northern flank and from enabling their
submarines to prey on Atlantic shipping. 122
The second major problem with this defensive
approach to the situation on the Northern Flank is that it
makes no provision for the secure reinforcement and resupply
of Norway after the outbreak of hostilities. In the context
of Norway's strategic location, its vulnerable security
posture, and the nature of the Soviet threat; it becomes
readily apparent that the Alliance must possess a viable
means of reinforcing Norway to guarantee its successful
defense. Additionally, to maintain the war effort and
civilian population in Norway large quantities of supplies
will be needed from outside the country. Currently, the
majority of Norway's reinforcements and almost all. of its
supplies must come by sea. This defensive strategy assumes
that Norway could be supplied across the North Sea, but
without control of the Norwegian Sea this may prove to be a
much more difficult task than it appears. 123
Any strategy that isolates Norway from its rein-
forcements and essential supplies by not challenging the
Soviets for control of the Norwegian Sea, seals Norway's
fate and forfeits the advantage of its strategic position.
In recent testimony before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on
Sea Power and Force Projection, Secretary Lehman flatly
12 2 Lehman, p. 51
123 With the Northern Fleet in control of the Norwegian
Sea and the Baltic Fleet pressuring the Danish Straits, the
North Sea resupply effort seems impossible.
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rejected a defensive strategy based on the GIUK gap for this
reason. He emphasized that
It should be clear to everyone that if the NATO treaty
means anything, it means that we have to protect and to
hold Norway. The minimum reinforcement plans require
both the Marines and the Ace mobile force to move by
sea. They all have to go by ship, to Norway, after the
conflict breaks out. If we allow the Norwegian Sea to
be controlled by the Soviet Union, Norway is
untenable. 1 2 *
The final criticism of a defensive strategy is that
it simply is not consistent with the lessons of naval
history or the fundamentals of sound naval tactics. To many
strategists, the defensive is considered the dominant
tactical posture and while this may be true in land warfare,
it does not apply to war at sea.
At sea, there has been no counterpart to prepared
positions and the effects of terrain, nor anything
corresponding to the rule-of- thumb , 3-to-l attacker-to-
defender ratio. There are no mountains nor swamps to
guard flanks, no rivers to cross or defend, and no high
ground. A fleet tactical commander keeps no force in
reserve and all his energy is devoted to attacking the
enemy effectively before the enemy can do so. At sea,
offense dominates in a way foreign to ground commanders
.
When a tactical commander is not competitive, he had
better stand clear because . . . .he will have little
to show for the loss of his force. 125
In warfare at sea it is the force that seizes the
initiative, even if it is numerically inferior, that more
often prevails. The lessons of Salamis, Trafalgar, and
Midway are still appropriate even in the age of the guided
missile. When these lessons are viewed in the context of
Soviet naval operations, exercises, and patterns of
12U U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Forces.
Subcommittee on Sea Power and Force Projection, testimony 14
March 1984, pp. 3870-3871.
125 Wayne P. Hughes, "On the Integration of Naval Tactics
and Maritime Strategy," Paper prepared for the May
Conference on "Maritime Strategy: Issues and Perspectives, '
Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College,
15-17 May 1985.
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development, their message is only reinforced. It is quite
clear that the Soviets would be perfectly happy with a NATO
maritime strategy that called for a defensive barrier across
the GIUK gap with no insertion of NATO naval forces into the
Norwegian Sea. This factor alone should be incentive enough
to dismiss a defensive strategy in the region.
On balance a defensive strategy based on a barrier
at the GIUK gap falls far short of achieving the essential
strategic objectives on the Northern Flank. First, it makes
no provision for reinforcing and resupplying Norway after
the start of a war. Second, this defensive strategy
concedes the Norwegian Sea to the Soviets at the outset of
the war which makes NATO's t.ask of regaining control of the
Norwegian Sea to reinforce and resupply much more difficult.
4. Forward Defense : The Maritime Strategy
NATO's final strategic option on the Northern Flank
is a forward defense strategy that is essentially offensive
in nature. What makes this approach different than a
barrier strategy at the GIUK gap is that it calls for
engaging the enemy as far forward as possible. Instead of
attempting to hold the Soviets north of the GIUK gap, this
strategy envisions the Northern Fleet being bottled-up
behind an offensive barrier at the Greenland-Svalbard-North
Cape gap. This forward barrier would be supported by
layered defenses along the access routes to the North
Atlantic which would include an ASW barrier at the GIUK gap.
According to Vice Admiral Henry C. Mustin, Commai>ler NATO
Striking Fleet Atlantic (COMSTRIKFLTLANT) , forward defense
captures the essence of NATO's most basic strategy which is
to defend the territorial integrity of its member nations.
This basic NATO strategy is just as important on the
Northern Flank as it is on the Central Front, he specifi-
cally states that
The maritime objectives of that strategy in the Northern
Region are to protect Norway from amphibious assault, to
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assist Norway within NATO to resist land and air
attacks, to prevent the Soviets using Norwegian facili-
ties against NATO and to contain the Soviet Northern
Fleet at best by destroying it at sea. 126
As was previously noted, the U.S. Navy's Maritime
Strategy is an articulation of the forward defense concept
and it is in fact the driving force behind NATO's strategy
on the Northern Flank. The U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy
recognizes the absolute necessity of controlling the
Norwegian Sea. It calls for challenging the Soviets in the
Norwegian Sea rather than conceding it without a fight.
Aircraft carrier battle groups, submarines, and land-based
aircraft will all contribute to the success of this effort.
The current U.S. Navy leadership believes that such a
synergistic effort will restore NATO's ability to control
the Norwegian Sea and significantly reduce the Soviet capa-
bility to turn the Northern Flank.
A closer look at the Maritime Strategy reveals the
key elements of forward defense on the Northern Flank.
First, the Maritime Strategy is a deterrent strategy. It
deters because it directly addresses the problems that will
be encountered during a war with the Soviet Union and it
provides a means of overcoming those problems. Its founda-
tion is in war-fighting capability, but it is through war-
fighting capability that it deters. Recognizing the need to
control the Norwegian Sea, the Maritime Strategy calls for
the eventual insertion of carrier battle groups to achieve
that control. Carrier battle groups will not go charging
into the Norwegian Sea at the outbreak of war, but they will
be in a position to move in when Soviet anti-carrier forces
have been reduced.
12S Mark Daly, "Protection of Convoy Routes a Key
Objective for OCEAN SAFARI 85," Jane's Defence Weekly , 5
October 1985, p. 751.
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Without a strong force of aircraft carriers in the
Norwegian Sea, NATO air defenses in the area would be forced
into a reactive mode of operation. Soviet Backfire bombers
could exploit gaps in the air defense coverage enroute to
their targets along the North Atlantic SLOCs . The presence
of American CVBGs with their long-range F-14 interceptors
would close those gaps and force the Soviets to counter this
threat to their bombers before they attack the SLOCs.
Redundant air defenses including fighters from Norway,
Iceland, and even Great Britain, as well as the battle
group's own defenses would make this a very costly endeavor
for the Soviets. The air defense situation on the Northern
Flank can be summed-up quite simply: "if the air over the
North Cape is hotly contested, NATO will control the air
over the Norwegian Sea." 127 What this means is that the
Soviets will be too busy contesting NATO in the airspace
over northern Norway to challenge NATO's control of the air
over the Norwegian Sea. Operating under these conditions
the various air defense forces of the Alliance should be-
able to achieve a highly favorable exchange ratio against
Soviet bombers that venture out of the Kola Peninsula to
strike at the battle groups in the Norwegian Sea. If prop-
erly coordinated, NATO air defenses could virtually elimi-
nate the bomber threat to the aircraft carriers and the
SLOCs.
Second, the Maritime Strategy is a forward-press
strategy that seizes the initiative and seeks to engage the
Soviets on terms that are favorable to the naval forces of
the Alliance. On the Northern Flank this means that NATO
will attempt ". . .to have its forces north of the GIUK gap
before the Soviets are able to deploy their forces to the
area." 128 Nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) armed
127 Wood and Hanley, p. 9.
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with ASW torpedoes and cruise missiles will initially take
the fight to the enemy. Their primary mission will be to
reduce the number of Soviet submarines that are operating in
the Norwegian Sea. Maritime patrol aircraft will assist the
SSNs in this effort while the carrier battle groups are held
in reserve, waiting for their opportunity to strike.
Additionally, the SSNs can employ their long-range cruise
missiles (TLAM-C) in coordinated attacks with deep strike
aircraft (like the FB-111, A-6E, TORNADO, or even the B-52s)
against the Soviet bases on the Kola Peninsula. Attacks
like these could be used to attrite both the long-range
bomber force and the submarine force. Only after both of
these threats are reduced will the battle groups move into
the Norwegian Sea to establish control.
Strategic warning and the willingness of NATO's
political leaders to act on that warning are critical to the
success of this strategy. If NATO fails to gain control of
the Norwegian Sea before the outbreak of hostilities, the
Alliance will have to progressively reduce Soviet forces in
the Norwegian Sea to gain control. This process is commonly
referred to as roll back and it is the situation that NATO's
maritime forces will most likely encounter on the Northern
Flank.
Third, the Maritime Strategy is a combined-arms and
coalition strategy. It is not a naval strategy that depends
solely on U.S. Navy and Marine Corps assets. It is instead
a joint service strategy that recognizes the unique contri-
butions of America's allies and the need to integrate all of
these assets. In addition to the United States and Norway,
the maritime forces of Britain, the Netherlands, and West
Germany will be integrated into the effort to gain and main-
tain control of the Norwegian Sea. 129
Objective for OCEAN SAFARI 85," Jane ' s Defence Weekly , 5
October 1985, p. 749.
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The movement of three or more American aircraft
carrier battle groups into the Norwegian Sea is considered
necessary to achieve sea control. 130 Together these battle
groups will form what is called a battle force. The primary
mission of this battle force should be to seek out and
destroy Soviet naval forces (air, surface, and subsurface)
in the Norwegian Sea. With this mission accomplished, the
battle force can then employ its considerable power
projection capability (attack aircraft, land attack cruise-
missiles, and naval gunfire) to support NATO ground forces
fighting on the Central Front and the Northern Flank.
Combined-arms operations are absolutely critical to the
survival and success of the battle force in the Norwegian
Sea. According to Admiral Watkins
,
Carrier battle groups supported by attack submarines,
land based aviation, and surveillance assets possess the
combat capability necessary to operate successfully,
even in high-threat areas. 131
The crucial question that must be answered in the
struggle for the control of the Norwegian Sea is- -What NATO
maritime asset has the best exchange ratio for a given
Soviet threat? The preferred ASW platform is obviously the
SSN which also has a major role in the anti-surface
campaign. Maritime patrol aircraft can be used to augment
the SSNs in the ASW effort and a coordinated attack
129 The West German Navy concentrates 75 percent of its
surface forces and 100 percent of its aviation assets in the
Baltic Sea. Despite this emphasis on the Baltic, the
Germans provide over 30 percent of the NATO naval forces in
the North Sea and above. "W German Admiral Discusses Naval
Strategy," Jane ' s Defence Weekly , 1 June 1985, p. 959.
130 A carrier battle group includes one or more aircraft
carriers; several cruisers, destroyers, and frigates; and
usually one or two SSNs operating in direct support. At
least three aircraft carriers are considered necessary to
provide the round-the-clock air defense that is considered
essential in the Norwegian Sea.
131 Edgar Ulsamer, "Bobbing, Weaving, and Fighting
Smart," Air Force Magazine , August 1983, p. 92.
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involving all strike assets should achieve the desired
effect against the surface threat. Coordinating all the air
defense assets against the long-range bomber threat is also
necessary, but it should also be recognized that the carrier
based F-14 with its Phoenix missile was designed specifi-
cally to counter this threat. Clearly, the CVBG should not
be the primary ASW force nor should it be expected to stand
alone against the air threat, but what it can do is make a
substantial contribution in both of these warfare areas.
The battle group's primary mission is power projection and
in that area it has no rival.
Each year NATO performs a series of exercises to
sharpen its skills at carrying out this strategy. NATO's
recent OCEAN SAFARI 85 exercise was a clear indication of
the Alliance's intention to reinforce and resupply Norway by
sea. For the first time the exercise area was extended into
the Norwegian Sea to demonstrate
the determination of NATO to carry out a
"forward defence" strategy, not being content simply to
contain any Warsaw Pact naval forces to the north east
of the Greenland, Iceland, UK gap (GIUKl but to take
positive steps to force the aggressor back towards the
homeland. 1 3
z
The argument that is most often offered in opposi-
tion to the Maritime Strategy is that it does not contribute
4
to conventional deterrence in Western Europe 133 Some oppo-
nents even believe that the strategy threatens conventional
deterrence. The fundamental issue here is the allocation of
scarce resources and the belief is that the Maritime
Strategy with its 600-Ship Navy will take resources away
from the forces on the Central Front. Building up to a
13 2 Daly, "Protection of Convoy Routes," p. 749
133 For a complete explanation of this conclusion see
Robert W. Komer, 'Maritime Strategy vs. Coalition Defense,"
Foreign Affairs
,
Summer 1982, pp. 1124-1144.
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force of fifteen aircraft carrier battle groups is
undeniably an expensive undertaking, but that force is
considered necessary to achieve America's national security
objectives. What the critics fail to recognize is that if
the Soviets control the Norwegian Sea, the rear of the
Central Front will be exposed to attack from the sea and the
North Atlantic SLOCs will be much more vulnerable.
To counter the opposition on this issue, Secretary
Lehman asserts that the Soviets will have to shift assets
from the Central Region to defeat NATO forces on the
Northern Flank. 13U Soviet actions in response to NATO exer-
cises on the Northern Flank support the Secretary's asser-
tions. During these exercises the Soviets have in fact sent
long-range air assets from the Central Region to the north
to reinforce their forces on the Kola Peninsula, but it is
doubtful that they would divert these forces during a
general war with NATO.
Another common criticism of the Maritime Strategy is
that it is not endorsed and fully supported by the uniformed
leaders of the U.S. Navy. A review of the literature
reveals that this is not the case. The CNO and SACLANT are
the two most noteworthy examples, but the opinion of Vice
Admiral Mustin, the man who will personally lead NATO's
naval striking forces in the Atlantic during a war with the
Soviet Union, is probably more relevant. There is little
doubt where Admiral Mustin stands on the issue. He specifi-
cally states that "there is no logical, historical or legal
reason to insist on a military strategy that is purely
defensive." 1 35
The issue of feasibility is what prompts the contro-
versy over whether or not the uniformed leadership of the
13U Getler, p. A4
.
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Navy supports the Maritime Strategy. Critics of the
Strategy assert that it should not be employed because it
cannot be successfully carried out with current assets.
They believe that carrier battle groups in the Norwegian Sea
would be extremely vulnerable to attack by Soviet submarines
and cruise-missile carrying bombers. 136 As a result of this
vulnerability, the battle groups would be too busy defending
their aircraft carriers to seize the initiative and take the
fight to the enemy. There is some truth in these asser-
tions, but what the critics fail to recognize is the inher-
ently attrition-oriented nature of sea warfare. Carrier
battle groups that are engaging and destroying attacking
Soviet submarines are in fact, accomplishing their mission
even, if they are absorbing some losses of their own.
A Soviet invasion of Norway can only be deterred if
the Soviets are convinced that the Alliance has the resolve
to defend Norwegian sovereignty and the clearest signal of
that resolve is embodied in the U.S. Navy's Maritime
Strategy
.
C. THE ROLE NUCLEAR WEAPONS
1. Ijs the Sea an Escalation Barrier ?
There are two basic schools of thought concerning
the role of nuclear weapons at sea during a major East-West
war. The fundamental issue that divides the two schools is
whether or not the sea can be considered an escalation
barrier. 137 One school of thought which for the purpose of
this study is referred to as pro-barrier, believes that both
the U.S. and the Soviet Union will view the sea as an
13S For a complete discussion of this issue see
Stansfield Turner and George Thibault, "Preparing for the
Unexpected: The Need for a New Military Strategy," Foreign
Affairs
,
Fall 1982, pp. 122-134.
&~
137 For an in-depth analysis of this issue see Gordon H.
McCormick and Mark E. Miller, "American Seapower at Risk:
Nuclear Weapons in Soviet Naval Planning," Orbis, Summer
1981, pp. 351-367.
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escalation barrier. They postulate that nuclear weapons can
be used at sea without their use spreading to land theaters
because collateral damage will be minimal or non-existent.
The other school of thought which will be referred to as
anti-barrier, believes that the use of nuclear weapons at
sea may or may not lead to their use on land. They postu-
late that this uncertainty about the escalation of nuclear
war at sea will delay the maritime use of nuclear weapons
until after the first exchange on land.
People who accept the pro-barrier line of thinking
see much danger in moving large naval forces, especially
carrier battle groups, into the Norwegian Sea. They believe
that these forces are particularly vulnerable to the effects
of nuclear weapons and that they make very inviting targets.
While CVBGs represent a large concentration of American
national power and resources, they also pose a substantial
threat to the Kola Peninsula and Soviet forces in the
Region. Senator Sam Nunn, during a Senate subcommittee
hearing on Sea Power and Force Projection, offered the
following analysis of the situation:
What I am saying to you is if you put all of those
resources together into one task force and head right
toward the Soviets very strategic targets in that area,
I think . . . will lower the nuclear threshold and make
it much more likely that that nuclear threshold will be
crossed, because you will have such a huge, lucrative
target. It will pose such a threat to them that I think
it will be almost irresistible. 138
The anti-barrier group believes that the Soviets
will be deterred from using nuclear weapons at sea by the
strategic nuclear deterrent of the United States. If the
Soviets use nuclear weapons against a NATO naval force oper-
ating in the Norwegian Sea, the United States will surely
respond in kind. The U.S. response could be an all-out
138 U.S. Senate, p. 3872.
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offensive against the Soviet SSBN force or it could be a
nuclear strike against the bases of the force that launched
the original attack. Regardless, the response has the
potential of leading up the escalation ladder and the threat
of escalation beyond the maritime environment should theo-
retically deter the initial use of nuclear weapons by the
Soviets at sea. The important point is that they do not
discount the use of nuclear weapons altogether, but that
they believe that if nuclear weapons are used at sea they
will also be used on land.
The Navy's leaders view the vulnerability of its
carrier battle groups in relative teams. They are quick to
point out that a CVBG moving at thirty knots is much more
difficult to target with nuclear weapons than a stationary
airfield located anywhere in the world. This difficulty in
targeting greatly enhances the survivability of the battle
group and it should be factored into any assessment of CVBG
vulnerability. In response to questions concerning the
vulnerability of carrier battle groups to a barrage ICBM
attack the CNO made the following observation which indi-
cates the problems with targeting a CVBG with any weapon:
one carrier battle group takes up 56,000
square miles. The neighboring one is 250 miles away.
He also takes up 56,000 square miles. The other is off
in another direction, another 250 miles. This is not a
World War II kind of diposition. These dispositions
cover an area equivalent to all of central Europe.
So we are not talking about ships that can be taken
out with nuclear weapons in some kind of barrage attack.
All the studies have shown this thinking to be
unsound . * 3 9
2. Should We Sink Their SSBNs ?
Another nuclear planning consideration that is
extremly important in the northern region is the role of





fairly well known fact, that American SSNs have demonstrated
the capability in peacetime to penetrate Soviet SSBN
bastions with relative ease 1M As a result of this capa-
bility there is a strong incentive to send the SSNs hunting
for Soviet SSBNs especially in their Northern Fleet
bastions. 1 " 1 If the United States and NATO employ their SSNs
in this manner, what will be the Soviet response? This
question has very serious implications, especially when it
is realized that the Soviets do not possess a similar capa-
bility to threaten the West's SSBNs and that the U.S. is in
the process of deploying a new generation hard target kill
capable weapons (the Trident II D-5 SLBM and the MX ICBM)
that severely threaten Soviet ICBMs
.
In addition to their capability to penetrate the
bastions and hunt Soviet SSBNs, NATO's attack submarines are
also valuable assets in the Alliance's effort to gain and
maintain control of the Norwegian Sea. Submarines are
considered the preeminent ASW platforms and NATO SSNs will
be absolutely essential to the ASW campaign in the Norwegian
Sea and North Atlantic. It is believed that the interests
of the Alliance and the United States will be better served
by employing the vast majority of NATO's SSNs outside of the
Soviet SSBN bastions to contain the flow of Soviet subma-
rines into the Norwegian Sea.
no Ackley, p. 42
1U1 A closely related issue is whether or not a campaign
against the conventional Soviet forces in the area would be
interpreted as a threat to the SSBNs. See Barry R. Posen,
"Inadvertent Nuclear War? Escalation and NATO s Northern
Flank," International Security , Fall 1982, pp. 28-54.
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V. WHAT IS NEEDED ?
Clearly, NATO's strategy on the Northern Flank should be
built on the foundation of forward defense and the U.S.
Navy's Maritime Strategy. However, this strategy alone does
not answer all of the questions or achieve all of the objec-
tives. There is a definite need to increase the amount of
prepositioned equipment and NATO war supplies in Norway.
This will reduce NATO's dependence on sealift to reinforce
Norway during the initial stages of a war and it will
strengthen deterrence. Because it is the only earmarked
ground combat unit, the CAST Brigade should have the highest
priority in the prepositioning effort.
If deterrence fails, forward defense is an absolute
necessity to protect NATO's North Atlantic SLOCs and to
guarantee the defense of Norway. Three factors will deter-
mine whether or not forward defense on the Northern Flank
will be successful. First, the Alliance must react promptly
to crisis situations throughout NATO. When East-West
tensions in Europe rise or when superpower confrontation
seems eminent somewhere else in the world, the political
leaders of NATO must respond accordingly. If a real threat
of war begins to materialize, NATO maritime forces must be
allowed to deploy to their positions in the Norwegian Sea
and the North Atlantic before the Soviets can concentrate
their naval forces in these vital areas. NATO naval forces
would be at a severe disadvantage if they have to fight
their way into the Norwegian Sea, but if they are there when
the fighting starts the Soviets may never make it out of the
Barents Sea and Arctic Ocean.
The second critical factor will be NATO's ability to
control the airspace above Norway. If a large portion of
the earmarked aircraft reinforcements arrive in Norway
before the outbreak of hostilities, the Soviets will be
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hard-pressed to gain control of the air above northern
Norway and the Norwegian Sea. NATO has sufficient aircraft
assets dedicated to the defense of the region to retain
control of Norwegian airspace and to maintain the flow of
reinforcements into Norway. If the Soviets chose to chal-
lenge NATO in the air above Norway they will have to shift
large numbers of aircraft out of the Central Front region to
seize control of Norwegian airspace.
The success of NATO's ASW forces at containing the
Northern Fleet's submarines is the third and most important
factor affecting the results of forward defense on the
Northern Flank. From the very outset of a crisis, NATO ASW
forces must be in a position to locate, track, and destroy
all Soviet submarines as they move into the Norwegian Sea.
The critical element of this effort should be a SSN barrier
along the northern periphery of the Norwegian Sea which is
supported by additional layers of SSNs along the access
routes to the North Atlantic. This task will be extremely
difficult to perform because the Soviets will undoubtedly
attempt to delay the start of hostilities until their forces
are in advantageous positions. Regardless, the more Soviet
submarines that are targeted during peacetime, the greater
the chances of success.
Immediately after the start of the war, the SSN barrier
should turn into a distant blockade of Soviet northern
ports. Dense ASW minefields should replace the SSNs along
the barrier and the SSNs should be used to destroy any
Soviet submarines that penetrate the blockade. Other SSNs,
maritime patrol aircraft, and carrier battle groups should
be employed to support the blockade. They will be tasked
with prosecuting any Soviet submarines in the southern
Norwegian Sea and the North Atlantic.
American carrier battle groups are essential to the
success of forward defense on the Northern Flank for three
crucial reasons. First, CVBGs will be a necessary element
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of. the NATO effort to establish and maintain control of the
Norwegian Sea. Their primary purpose will be to seek and
destroy the Soviet Northern Fleet. Second, the air defense
aircraft of the battle groups will be needed to fill the
gaps in the air defense network over the Northern Flank.
Finally, from a central location between the two regions the
attack aircraft of the CVBGs could provide desperately
needed close air support for the ground forces fighting on
the Central Front and Northern Flank.
It would be foolish to think that the Soviets would not
oppose the movement of American carrier battle groups into
the Norwegian Sea and it would be just as foolish to assume
that the battle groups could by themselves defeat the Soviet
anti- carrier forces which they would surely encounter upon
entering the Norwegian Sea. Undeniably, the carrier battle
group has its vulnerabilities, but it is still a very
capable fighting force with tremendous power projection
capabilities. Ongoing programs to improve the carrier
battle group's AAW (anti-air warfare) and ASW defenses are
essential to maintain the CVBG ' s capability to operate in
high- threat areas. Of particular interest should be coun-
termeasures to reduce the low-flyer threat, methods to
defeat the long-range bomber threat, and improved detection
capabilities to counter the latest generation of Soviet
nuclear-powered submarines.
On the Northern Flank, integration of NATO assets is
necessary in all warfare environments- - land, air, surface,
and subsurface. NATO force fighting on the ground in Norway
will need close air support from fighter/ground attack
aircraft stationed in Norway and on aircraft carriers oper-
ating off the Norwegian coast. All NATO air defense assets,
including those in Norway, Iceland, Greenland, and Britain
as well as those flying from carrier flight decks, must be
coordinated to achieve control of the airspace over the
Northern Flank. Attack aircraft, cruise missiles, and naval
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gunfire must be combined with land based strike aircraft
(including B-52s armed with Harpoons) to eliminate the
Soviet surface threat. Finally, the ASW forces of the
Alliance must work together to contain and destroy Soviet
submarines operating in the Norwegian Sea. The NATO ASW
forces that will be involved in this effort include SSNs
,
land based maritime patrol and surveillance aircraft,
carrier based ASW aircraft, and ASW capable surface
ships. 1 "* 2 Aggressive actions, improved capabilities, and
coordination of assets will make forward defense on the
Northern Flank work.
lu2 Even B-52s could be employed in this effort because
of their mining capability.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
The successful defense of the Northern Flank is abso-
lutely essential to the NATO Alliance. If NATO fails to
defend this flank, its vital North Atlantic SLOCs will be
severely threatened and the rear of the Central Front will
be exposed to attack from the sea.
Norway's geo-strategic location makes it the key to the
defense of the Northern Flank and a significant NATO advan-
tage. It is an advantage that must be defended both in
peace and in war. Analysis of the nature of the Soviet
threat to Norway reveals that the Soviets are pursuing a
strategy that is designed to neutralize Norway from the very
outset of a conflict with NATO. Ideally, what the Soviets
want is to peacefully force Norway to withdraw from NATO
before a conflict starts and their preparations for war
facilitate this process.
Because of Norway's reliance on NATO's deterrent shield
and self-imposed restrictions, its defense is heavily depen-
dent on reinforcements from its allies. To prevent Norway's
neutralization, NATO must possess the capability to rein-
force and resupply Norway during a war with the Soviet
Union. Currently this capability is dependent on NATO's
ability to control the Norwegian Sea. The Soviets will
undoubtedly try to control the Norwegian Sea at start of a
war with NATO because of its obvious strategic importance.
To guarantee the defense of Norway and the Alliance's North
Atlantic SLOCs, NATO must prevent this from happening. If
NATO does not pursue a strategy and possess the capability
to challenge the Northern Fleet in the Norwegian Sea, Norway
could be lost to NATO even before the outbreak of a war.
A strategy of forward defense, which is articulated in
the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy, is considered the most
appropriate strategy for NATO on the Northern Flank. A
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defensive barrier at the GIUK gap should be an integral part
of this strategy, but it cannot by itself achieve the
Alliance's basic objectives in the region. NATO should also
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